2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011
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The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively

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Cited by 62 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…(Detzer, 2010). However, there is relative consensus among authors (Dey, 1989;Mauro, 1998;Treisman, 2000;Dietrich, 2010;Reiter & Steensma , 2010) that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2002). 3 We opted to compare FDI versus non-equity modes instead of considering each entry mode (acquisition, greenfield investment, joint venture, etc.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Detzer, 2010). However, there is relative consensus among authors (Dey, 1989;Mauro, 1998;Treisman, 2000;Dietrich, 2010;Reiter & Steensma , 2010) that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2002). 3 We opted to compare FDI versus non-equity modes instead of considering each entry mode (acquisition, greenfield investment, joint venture, etc.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Tavares (2003) showed through cross-country regression that foreign aid is associated with lower corruption (which he highlights does not imply a causal effect), and this may have been because of the rules and conditions associated with aid, and the ability to pay salaries may reduce the corruption of officials. But there is increasing research that modifies generalizing statements (Dietrich 2010).…”
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confidence: 99%
“…may reduce the corruption of officials. But there is increasing research that modifies generalising statements (Dietrich 2010, who highlights different dynamics in different sectors).…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Sector-wide approaches imply that: "all significant 68 See for example http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2008/09/hype-and-realit.html 69 Dietrich (2010) argues that corrupt governments are likely to comply with donor objectives in sectors were compliance is cheap; my own experience in Orissa showed that there are sectors (forestry, water) where donor involvement (at the public policy rather than project level) is much less welcome, possibly because of the strength of vested interests. The power sector reform in Orissa however appears a distinct outlier in this respect.…”
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confidence: 99%