2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29624-6_1
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The Politics of Military Reform in Indonesia and Nigeria

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…The only other arena in which some civilian influence on defence strategies occurs, then, is the parliamentary committee that cooperates with the defence ministry. Committee I, which covers defence, communications, international relations and intelligence, has the right to question defence ministry and armed forces officials on their long-term defence strategy, and it makes extensive use of that right (Rueland & Manea, 2012). But while nodding politely, military representatives have rarely made fundamental changes to their strategy based on this feedback.…”
Section: Arenas Of Civilian Controlmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The only other arena in which some civilian influence on defence strategies occurs, then, is the parliamentary committee that cooperates with the defence ministry. Committee I, which covers defence, communications, international relations and intelligence, has the right to question defence ministry and armed forces officials on their long-term defence strategy, and it makes extensive use of that right (Rueland & Manea, 2012). But while nodding politely, military representatives have rarely made fundamental changes to their strategy based on this feedback.…”
Section: Arenas Of Civilian Controlmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This political patronage weakened the DPR’s function, becoming a symbol of representative democracy in Indonesia due to the DPR’s lack of criticality towards the Soeharto government in overseeing its policies. Rüland and Manea (2013: 124) explained how the policy-making initiative came from the executive and improved the DPR, which lasted for a long period and caused the executive to dominate the DPR’s political process. Changes gradually occurred several years before the New Order regime collapsed in May 1998.…”
Section: Dysfunction Of the Dpr During The New Order Eramentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, research on Indonesian and Nigerian parliaments as political actors and arenas of military reform revealed that important political battles of the reform process have been waged for passing laws that ensure guaranteed access to information. However, when this was not successful, further progress for SSR was hampered (Rüland et al 2012). Given that the state is the only entity that can guarantee the implementation of human rights principles, such as freedom of access to information, SSG/R, if successfully implemented, can substantially contribute to the attainment of Target 16.10, especially with regards to access to security-related information.…”
Section: B Differences Between Ssg/r and Sdg-16mentioning
confidence: 99%