The Politics of Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense

Mirilovic, Nikola

doi:10.5129/001041510x12911363509675

Cited by 28 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Long-term population forecasting is notoriously difficult (see Gietel-Basten and Sobotka 2020 for recent discourse in that field). This is especially the case to the extent that migration is a powerful force of demographic change in developed countries (Parr 2020), yet it is fundamentally difficult to forecast, particularly due to factors like political change (e.g., Mirilovic 2010;Wiśniowski, Bijak, and Shang 2014) and climate change (e.g., Gemenne 2011;Hoffmann et al 2020). However, even the high-growth variant of the UN's 2019 World Population Prospects suggests that the global old age dependency ratio (20-69 versus 70+) will rise from 10% in 2020 to 22% in 2100.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A decade of TFR declines suggests no relationship between development and sub-replacement fertility rebounds

Gaddy¹

2021

DemRes

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BACKGROUNDHuman development is historically associated with fertility declines. However, demographic paradigms disagree about whether that relationship should hold at very high levels of development. Using data through the late 2000s, Billari (2009, 2011) found that very high national levels of the Human Development Index (HDI) were associated with increasing total fertility rates (TFRs), at least at high levels of gender parity. OBJECTIVEThis paper seeks to update that finding and to introduce the Human Life Indicator (HLI) as a novel measure of development within this debate. RESULTSAmong the countries that reached HDI 0.8 before 2010 (n = 40), there is no clear relationship between changes in the HDI and the TFR at HDI > 0.8 through 2018. Conditioning on high levels of gender parity does not change this finding. This negative result is closely tied to the sharp declines in fertility seen in most highly developed countries since 2010 -a median decline of 0.125 in tempo-adjusted TFR through the most recent available year (n = 23). Furthermore, the longer historical coverage of the HLI shows that at all high levels of development, at least one country has exhibited almost every level of TFR between 1.2 and 2.0. CONCLUSIONSFertility declines over the last decade mean that the previous suggestion that very high levels of development and gender equality foster fertility increases is no longer supported on the national level.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A decade of TFR declines suggests no relationship between development and sub-replacement fertility rebounds

Gaddy¹

2021

DemRes

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“…Facing a dangerous geopolitical environment, more welcoming immigration policies are intended to directly bolster the armed forces through recruitment, while also increasing potential military strength in more gradual ways by fostering greater economic wealth through the resources and perspectives offered by newcomers (Rudolph 2006, 31). Cross-national evidence shows that countries experiencing severe external threats actually tend to implement fewer restrictions on immigration inflows (Mirilovic 2010). Governments worried over the state of their armed forces likewise have tended to restrict emigration outflows to maintain military recruitment potential (Foreman-Peck 1992).…”

Section: Military Service and National Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Gets to Have a DREAM? Examining Public Support for Immigration Reform

Wallace

2019

International Migration Review

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This article assesses how different notions of citizenship shape mass attitudes toward immigration reform. We examine the underpinnings of the military service and college education provisions that were at the center of the 2010 DREAM Act, which sought to provide a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrant youth in the United States. Employing a survey experiment on a nationally representative US sample, we unpack the extent to which the mass public is willing to support immigration reform based on criteria tied to undocumented immigrants’ educational attainment or enlistment in the armed forces. While education has little effect on its own, military service significantly increases public support for a pathway to citizenship. The positive effect of military service endures when it is paired with less popular provisions, suggesting that a military criterion can serve as a basis of support for broader immigration legislation. Moreover, the effects are strongest for those groups who are traditionally viewed as being most opposed to immigration reforms that expand access to citizenship. The results of this study have implications for public attitudes toward immigration, the persistence of the citizen-soldier ideal, and the importance of framing in the policy-making process.

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“…One example is the argument that authoritarian states adopt more permissive immigrant admissions policies than democracies (e.g. Breunig et al, 2011;Mirilovic, 2010). Democracies may also be more likely targets for coercively engineered migrations, as Greenhill argues in her chapter in this volume.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%