The Politics of Crisis in Europe

Abstract

The Politics of Crisis in Europe explores the resilience of the European Union in the face of repeated crises perceived to threaten its very existence. While it is often observed after the fact that these crises serve as opportunities for integration, this is the first critical analysis to suggest that we cannot fully understand the nature and severity of these crises without recognising the role of societal reaction to events and the nature of social narratives about crisis, especially those advanced by the media. Through a close examination of the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2005 constitutional crisis, and the 2010–12 Eurozone crisis, this book identifies a pattern across these episodes, demonstrating how narratives about crises provide the means to openly air underlying societal tensions that would otherwise remain under the surface, impeding further integration.

Counter-terrorism in the EU’s external relations

“…An oft-invoked cliché after the fact is that crises serve as opportunities, leading the EU to respond to crisis with more integration. The pattern across Europe's historical response to crisis of various sorts shows that there is more to this than the cliché implies (Cross 2017). When a crisis is perceived to be particularly severe, new dynamics often emerge within Europe, such as new levels of trust in EU institutions (Natorski and Pomorska 2016), desire for member states to stand together despite initial resistance (Orenstein and Keleman 2016), sense of common identity or rally-around-the-flag effect (i.e.…”

“…When a crisis is perceived to be particularly severe, new dynamics often emerge within Europe, such as new levels of trust in EU institutions (Natorski and Pomorska 2016), desire for member states to stand together despite initial resistance (Orenstein and Keleman 2016), sense of common identity or rally-around-the-flag effect (i.e. us vs. them), policy innovation (Bicchi 2007;Cross 2017), political will to do more or spend more in reaction to the crisis (Schilde 2016), and so on.…”

What Type of Power has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine–Russia Crisis? A Framework of Analysis

“…Crucially, we are not including domestic or EU crises, defined as moments in which the EU's existence is called into question because its own political order is threatened from within or from an exogenous shock (Ikenberry, , pp. 233–235; Krasner, ; Cross, ). We are concerned with international crises that happen outside of the EU's borders, as an ‘intermediate state between peace and war’ (Natorski, , p. 2), in which the EU is a potential actor in response.…”

The EU's Power in the Russia–Ukraine Crisis: Enabled or Constrained?

“…(Conversely, the weaker the crisis, the more likely it is that the EU will succumb to constraints on its power.) While we cannot be certain of this without further comparative work, the rationale behind the argument is that the more the EU faces a serious threat to itself from the outside, the more it will be willing to remove obstacles to the exercise of power (for example, see Cross, 2017). The obstacles include a variety of long-standing factors such as a propensity to achieve integration gradually, especially in the area of foreign and security policy (Howorth, 2007(Howorth, , 2014, historical differences in the use of the military, divergent threat perceptions and levels of ambition, nationally-oriented strategic cultures (Giegerich, 2006;Lindley-French, 2002;Meyer, 2006;Sjursen, 2006), and distribution of resources.…”