The Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective

Peters, B. Guy; Pierre, Jon

doi:10.4324/9780203799857

Cited by 412 publications

(173 citation statements)

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“…The level of politicization of the public bureaucracy appears to have been increasing in response to the decline in some other instrument of accountability (Peters and Pierre 2004;Rouban 2004). The numerous appointive positions on boards and in executive positions are patronage opportunities that might well have been seized upon even in the absence of a need to regain some political control, but the need to exert that control and to restore some level of accountability made these opportunities all the more welcome.…”

Section: The Complexity Of Service Deliverymentioning

confidence: 95%

Bureaucracy and Democracy

Peters

2010

Public Organiz Rev

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Section: The Complexity Of Service Deliverymentioning

confidence: 95%

Bureaucracy and Democracy

Peters

2010

Public Organiz Rev

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“…The benefits of strong institutional safeguards between politicians and bureaucrats has been noted by public administration scholars, from classical authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber to contemporary researchers (Wilson, 1887;Weber, 1978;Silberman 1993, p. 5;Peters and Pierre, 2004;Lewis, 2008;Grindle, 2012), but has received less attention in the literature exploring parties' use of clientelistic linkage strategies.…”

Section: Organizational Firewalls Within the Statementioning

confidence: 95%

“…The bulk of this latter strand of research explores the economic conditions that constitute more, or less, fertile soil for clientelism (Hicken, 2011;Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). This chapter draws on research from the field of public administration (e.g., Peters and Pierre, 2004;Grindle, 2012), and argues that the institutional framework structuring the interface between input (policy making) and output (policy implementing) institutions in the political system is a crucial component in political parties' choices of whether to attract voters via clientelistic or via programmatic linkage strategies. In doing so, this chapter seeks to contribute to the investigation of the interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship between specific institutional arrangements on the one hand, and parties' choices of linkage strategies with voters on the other .…”

Section: Notementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This institutional interface is highly porous in some countries, resulting in a high degree of political control of the bureaucracy, while in others institutional safeguards and constraints maintain a clear division of roles and jurisdictions and prevent the political elite from intervening in the day-to-day workings of the bureaucracy (Peters and Pierre, 2004;. A politicized bureaucracy expands parties' and individual politicians' opportunity to use public resources for partisan ends.…”

Section: Notementioning

confidence: 99%

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its organisation and its instruments. It is particularly concerned with how the changing conditions of contemporary governing affect perennial questions in political science and public administration. Executive Politics and Governance is therefore centrally interested in questions such as how politics interacts with bureaucracies, how issues rise and fall on political agendas, and how public organisations and services are designed and operated. This book series encourages a closer engagement with the role of politics in shaping executive structures, and how administration shapes politics and policy-making. In addition, this series also wishes to engage with the scholarship that focuses on the organisational aspects of politics, such as government formation and legislative institutions.The series welcomes high-quality research-led monographs with comparative appeal. Edited volumes that provide in-depth analysis and critical insights into the field of Executive Politics and Governance are also encouraged.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataElites, institutions and the quality of government / edited by Carl Dahlström, Associate Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden ; Lena Wängnerud, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. pages cm. -(Executive politics and governance) Includes bibliographical references. Summary: "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corru...

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“…874-875). Politicized competence thus can be defined as the readiness to invest in 'expertise development' and is not to be confused with politicization and partisanship (Peters and Pierre, 2004).…”

Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paper keepers or policy shapers? The conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process

Neuhold

Dobbels²

2014

Comp Eur Polit

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The Lisbon Treaty has substantially extended the co-legislative rights of the European Parliament (EP). This raises the general question of how the EP organizes itself internally in order to be able to maximize its input into the legislative process. In the quest of information processing, it is likely that officials inside the EP gain in importance. The article thus aims to clarify the conditions under which these EP officials impact on the EU policy process and as such can influence policy outcomes. The analysis is based on case studies from five different policy domains. The observations reflect that under certain conditions EP officials play a steering role in the EU decision-making process. As such they can have a significant impact on the policymaking process, defying the dualistic Weberian approach according to which politicians take decisions and officials merely implement.

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The Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective

Cited by 412 publications

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Bureaucracy and Democracy

Bureaucracy and Democracy

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Paper keepers or policy shapers? The conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process

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