The Political Life of Natural Infrastructure: Water Funds and Alternative Histories of Payments for Ecosystem Services in Valle del Cauca, Colombia

Abstract

This article shows the two-way relation between global norms and local conditions as they shape Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) theory and practice, through a case study of a water fund in Valle del Cauca, Colombia, the heartland of the country's sugarcane industry. Drawing on interviews, survey data and historical research, the article argues that the water fund should be understood in the context of the history of infrastructure for the sugarcane industry in the region, and that this infrastructural perspective provides a more nuanced insight into the fund's political life than the traditional PES framing. Furthermore, the article shows how the norms embedded in this locally-grown programme circulated through international networks to influence PES theory and design. This case offers one example of the need to attend to the multiple and geographically-specific histories of actually existing PES in order to understand its diversity in the present.

Exploring Gender Equity in Ecological Restoration: The Case of a Market-Based Program in Kenya

“…Research shows that power in leadership and representation influences how and for whom decisions are made, which has been reported elsewhere for the Maasai Mara (Thompson andHomewood 2002, Kaelo 2007), and in the context of other Kenyan market-based schemes (Bedelian 2014, Atela 2015, Chomba et al 2016. Disproportionate attention on distribution has even been shown to worsen pre-existing imbalances (vonHedemann 2020, Nelson et al 2020) and affect sociocultural acceptability of PES in the long term (Richardson and Lefroy 2016). A focus on distributive equity therefore masks underlying asymmetries and may jeopardize the potential for environmental projects to positively change decision-making and representation processes (Corbera et al 2009).…”

Uncovering Stakeholder Participation in Payment for Hydrological Services (PHS) Program Decision Making in Mexico and Colombia

“…Based on criticisms of PHS as a neoliberal tool for conservation, yet acknowledging the role of local actors in resisting international environmental policies, recent publications have called for an investigation into how local actors (PHS stakeholders) shape neoliberal programs to meet local needs [53][54][55]. Through case study research, social scientists have highlighted some of the institutional, cultural, and economic patterns that influence the adaptation of PHS policies to local contexts [50,54,[56][57][58][59].…”

“…For instance, the tropical dry forest covers less than 1% of its original area and is considered threatened in the plains and Central Andes [78]. The rate of deforestation has increased in the last decades [79,80] due to economic activities incentivized by the national government [77,78] and illegal armed groups [59,74,75].…”

“…It is worth noting that, unlike other tropical countries in the region, Colombia faces a long-time social conflict between the Colombian army, left-wing guerrillas, right-wing armed groups, and local and foreign drug traffickers [81] that has shaped the patterns of deforestation and conservation strategies [59,74,75]. Illegal armed groups have historically controlled the economic activities and type of actors that can access and use forested areas and national parks [74,81].…”

“…To counteract deforestation and forest degradation, the national government has issued forest use restrictions, established natural parks of local and national interests, controlled deforestation through the environmental agencies at the local, state, and national level, and incentivized conservation through payment for ecosystem services schemes [59,78]. The use of market-oriented schemes in conservation started in the late 1990s in Colombia [78], yet there had not been a state policy to guide the use of PHS-like schemes until mid-2017, after the peace agreement was signed between the government and one of the left-wing guerrillas [82].…”