The political hourglass: opportunistic behavior in local government policy decisions

Abstract

The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, publicprivate partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities supports the existence of asymmetric opportunistic behavior. Specifically, there is strong evidence that in preelection years, there is less likelihood of contracting out and PPP decisions being approved, and a greater probability of public externalization taking place. In post-election years, an increase in capital spending is associated with a lower probability of contracting out and of PPP. An increase in current spending in preelection years reduces the probability of decisions being taken on contracting out and PPP. These empirical results highlight the extent of opportunistic behavior in selecting management forms for the delivery of local government services.

Cost Efficiency in Municipal Solid Waste (MSW): Different Alternatives in Service Delivery for Small and Medium Sized Spanish Local Governments

“…The advantages of using this type of management include cost savings, as services can be provided at a lower cost and in a more efficient way [30,[35][36][37]. Within this category can be found the contracting out form, which can be defined as a form of privatization in which a private company makes residual profits from the provision of the service [34,38], and the public-private partnership (PPP), where the local authority and the entrepreneur share the operating results on the basis of what is fixed in the contract. In this way, the equity is held by both the public partner, who ensures that the public objectives of the service are met, and the private partner with industry experience, who is usually responsible for the day-to-day operation of the service [38,39].…”

“…For this reason, the relationship between different forms of management and the efficiency of the MSW service has been widely analyzed in the academic literature [7,45,46]. However, there is no global consensus on the best alternative for the provision of this service [3,38].…”

The Distortion of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Institutional Perspective of Central–Local Government Relations

“…Hodge et al, 2018). However, opportunistic behaviors occur in PPPs (Higuera-Molina et al, 2022; Maurya & Srivastava, 2019). Many PPP projects do not realize their expected objectives but increase government fiscal liabilities (Platz, 2016).…”

“…Governments seek to utilize private sector resources to develop infrastructure and relieve fiscal pressure and debt risks (G. Hodge et al, 2018). However, opportunistic behaviors occur in PPPs (Higuera-Molina et al, 2022;Maurya & Srivastava, 2019). Many PPP projects do not realize their expected objectives but increase government fiscal liabilities (Platz, 2016).…”

What drives the perceived legitimacy of collaborative governance? An experimental study

“…Recent empirical evidence suggests that policymakers tend to avoid collaborative public service delivery models before elections (de la Higuera-Molina et al, 2021). The theory of opportunistic political cycles could explain why this is the case, as policymakers perceive that citizens dislike collaborative arrangements and this can influence their electoral support.…”