The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933

Mahoney, Paul G.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.224729

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…According to Cox [1963], roughly one million Americans owned stock at the beginning of the 20th century. The success of the Liberty Bonds placement and the aggressive use of door‐to‐door distribution techniques in the aftermath of World War I (Mahoney [2001]) led to an increase in the number of shareholders to 5 million by 1927, equal to roughly 7% of the population. The boom at the end of the 1920s fueled an acceleration in the diffusion of stock ownership, doubling the number of investors.…”

Section: The Status Of Securities Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Future of Securities Regulation

Zingales¹

2009

J of Accounting Research

169

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The U.S. system of securities law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors' trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors' perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management.

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Section: The Status Of Securities Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Future of Securities Regulation

Zingales¹

2009

J of Accounting Research

169

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“…Beatty and Ritter (1986) shows that IPO underpricing is positively related to the uncertainty of investors regarding its value, and investment banks have an interest in maintaining an equilibrium amount of underpricing to earn a fair rate of return on their reputation capital. Tinic (1988) finds that IPO underpricng serves as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations of investment bankers (see also Mahoney, 2001). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Taiwan's Initial Public Offerings

Chang

Tang

2007

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics

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This paper has employed the nonparametric minimum convex input requirement set (MCIRS) approach to measure the premarket underpricing and aftermarket inefficiency in Taiwan's initial public offerings (IPOs). The empirical results show that first, the average level of underpricing in Taiwan's IPO premarket is 15.66%, and underpricings in the hot-and nonhot-market periods are not different. Second, underpricing in the electronic IPOs (purchased by both (informed) institutional investors and (uninformed) individual investors) is not different from that in the non-electronic IPOs (purchased by (uninformed) individual investors). This result may not be consistent with Rock's (1986) winner's curse explanation for IPO underpricing. Third, in the nonhot-market period, premarket underpricing disappears one week after trading (i.e. there is no aftermarket inefficiency), and in the hot-market period, new issues are overpriced one week after trading (i.e. there is an aftermarket inefficiency). The paper also finds that the commonly used method of valuing IPOs with priceearnings (P/E), market-to-book and price-to-sales multiples of comparable firms performs poorly in Taiwan's IPOs. The predictability of the comparable firms method improves when the market values-to-sales and enterprise value-to-sales multiples are used.JEL classification: G11, G14, and G32

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“…Consistent with the skepticism of Easterbrook and Fischel (1984), several authors suggest a special interest rather than a public interest impetus for SEC regulation. Mahoney (2001) argues that the SEC rules as to how and when information on securities offerings is disclosed subtly created entry barriers that benefited the special interests of incumbent investment banks. Schwert (1977) finds that the creation of the SEC had a significant, negative effect on the seat prices of the NYSE and concludes that neither a naïve public interest model nor a simple capture model accurately depicts SEC regulation.…”

Section: Framing Sec Regulation: Public Interest or Special Interest?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets

Mulherin

2007

Journal of Corporate Finance

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The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933

Cited by 21 publications

References 32 publications

The Future of Securities Regulation

The Future of Securities Regulation

Pricing Taiwan's Initial Public Offerings

Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets

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