The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Civil–Military Resource Substitution through International Brokerage

Abstract

What effects does participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) have on the participating countries’ civil–military resource allocation? Answering this question can widen our understanding of state motivations to contribute to the United Nations PKOs by incorporating the civil–military dynamic. We argue that contributing states can substitute part of their domestic military expenditures with external resources. Governments act as brokers between domestic military interests and international sources of rent, a process which we call civil–military resource substitution through international brokerage. By doing so, governments can (i) reduce part of the bottom-up demands for increased military spending (i.e., salaries and allowances) and (ii) outsource critical resources to meet military organizational priorities (i.e., training, weapons, perks for the military elite, and so on). Using cross-national statistical analysis, we find that the UN PKO contributing states allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the non-contributing states, and higher troop-contributing states are likely to allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the lower-contributing or non-contributing states. The implications point to a much wider role of the UN peacekeeping missions than what is previously understood and demonstrate their impacts beyond the host countries.