2009
DOI: 10.1353/eco.0.0018
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The Political Economy of Oil Production in Latin America

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Cited by 39 publications
(36 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
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“…The first looks at the link between natural resource abundance and the quality and effectiveness of political institutions. The underlying idea is that abundance of a commodity generates rents that might favour rent‐seeking behaviours, corruption, conflicts and/or political instability which have adverse effects on long‐term growth and distribution (Duncan, 2006; Guriev et al, 2002; Isham et al, 2003; Lane & Tornell, 1996; Manzano & Monaldi, 2008; Tornell & Lane, 1999). The second channel focuses on the fact that natural resource abundance might expose countries to price volatility (Sala‐i‐Martin & Subramanian, 2003).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first looks at the link between natural resource abundance and the quality and effectiveness of political institutions. The underlying idea is that abundance of a commodity generates rents that might favour rent‐seeking behaviours, corruption, conflicts and/or political instability which have adverse effects on long‐term growth and distribution (Duncan, 2006; Guriev et al, 2002; Isham et al, 2003; Lane & Tornell, 1996; Manzano & Monaldi, 2008; Tornell & Lane, 1999). The second channel focuses on the fact that natural resource abundance might expose countries to price volatility (Sala‐i‐Martin & Subramanian, 2003).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other works looking at the oil sector reached similar results (Guriev et al 2008). Furthermore, the nationalization of the oil industry becomes particularly attractive when concession contracts do not allow taxes to capture the windfalls of rapidly increasing international prices (Manzano and Monaldi 2008).…”
Section: The Academic Debate About Nationalizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Various authors have described how NOCs serve as sources of corrupt practices and vehicles to buy political consent in rentier states. Analyzing the oil production in Latin America, Manzano and Monaldi (2008), for example, note that national oil companies such as Mexican PEMEX often become a clientelistic instrument of the ruling party, providing rents that may be used to overemploy and overpay party supporters. McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007) describe how NOCs such as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) or Indonesia's Pertamina are misused to buy off political opponents.…”
Section: Resource Ownership Patterns and Intrastate Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%