The political economy of international organizations

Dreher, Axel; Michaelowa, Katharina

doi:10.1007/s11558-008-9049-y

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 86 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Research has established that entrepreneurial staff from international organizations strive to maximize their budgets and independence, shaping the evolution and policies of an organization (Dreher & Lang, 2016; Reinsberg, 2017b). Earmarked funding acts like a fire accelerant to this development at the expense of central management responsibility (Weinlich et al, 2020, pp.…”

Section: A Systemic Perspective On Earmarking In the Undsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation

Baumann

2020

Development Policy Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Motivation The share of earmarked funding to the development pillar of the United Nations (UN) has risen to a record level of 79% (2018) of its total revenue/spending. This poses severe implications for the organizational efficiency, aid effectiveness and multilateralism of the UN. Reforms have not been able to stem the trend towards earmarked funding, raising the question of what explains the continued rise of earmarking in the United Nations Development System (UNDS). Purpose This article aims to add a new perspective on earmarking, specifically in the UN. It tries to explain not the root causes of earmarking, but the dynamics of the significant rise over the last decade. The argument is that earmarking has been driven by three vicious circles: by the rational factors associated with a collective action breakdown, a change in norms of appropriateness, and institutional fragmentation. Approach and methods The article draws on funding data from the UN, on 65 interviews with UN staff and donor representatives conducted in the context of a recent research project, and on document analysis. Special attention is given to two donors, Sweden and Germany, dedicated multilateralists that have increased their earmarked resources in recent years. Findings Conventional explanations of earmarking in the UN—dissatisfaction with the performance of UN organizations, the desire for more accountability, policy differences with organizations—cannot fully explain the significant rise in earmarking over the last decade. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the UN system has reached a tipping point, so that earmarking has become self‐perpetuating. Policy implications The findings put a question mark after the premises that have so far guided practical efforts by the UN and member states to reduce the share of earmarked funding. They suggest that more fundamental changes to rules and incentives are required to rebalance the UN’s funding towards core contributions. Four specific recommendations are derived from the analysis.

show abstract

Section: A Systemic Perspective On Earmarking In the Undsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation

Baumann

2020

Development Policy Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…bank resolution standards (Quaglia, 2017b). 5 International organisations, however, may also be susceptible to interest group capture as they do not face re-election constraints and are removed from national public and media scrutiny (Dreher and Lang, 2016;Vaubel, 2004 and.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…They can also serve as scapegoats diverting the political blame and costs from national players. As such, international coordination may provide for sufficient incentives to overcome capture (Dreher and Lang, 2016;Vaubel, 2004 and.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation

Schuknecht

Siegerink

2020

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper empirically examines the implementation record of international financial regulation of the banking sector. The study finds that the size of the banking sector and the presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are positively associated with a stronger implementation record. These results suggest that cooperative motives of internalising externalities, creating a level playing field and preserving financial stability play a role in explaining the implementation record. We find evidence that this cooperative behaviour may be driven by the self-interest of global players as the positive record is particularly strong in countries where large banking sectors and big banks are both present, and where regulation only applies to large players. Sectoral concentration, bank health and the share of foreign ownership yield more mixed results as regards their impact on implementation.

show abstract

“…An earlier version of our paper also considered different levels of donor-country bias(Dreher et al 2018)-to simplify the exposition, however, we focus on the results with equal donor-country biases. 8 For a broad overview of the political economy of international organizations seeDreher and Lang (2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal decision rules in multilateral aid funds

2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While existing research has suggested that delegating foreign aid allocation decisions to a multilateral aid fund may incentivize recipient countries to invest in bureaucratic quality, our analysis links the fund’s decision rules to recipient-country investment by explicitly modeling the decision-making within multilateral aid funds. We find that majority rule induces stronger competition between recipients, resulting in higher investments in bureaucratic quality. Despite this advantage, unanimity can still be optimal since the increased investment under majority comes at the cost of low aid allocation to countries in the minority. The qualitative predictions of our model rationalize our novel empirical finding that, relative to organizations that use a consensus rule, organizations that use majority are more responsive to changes in recipient-country quality.

show abstract

The political economy of international organizations

Cited by 12 publications

References 86 publications

How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation

How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation

The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation

Optimal decision rules in multilateral aid funds

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About