The political economy of industrial pollution control: environmental regulation in Swedish industry for five decades

Abstract

The paper analyzes the prerequisites for a regulatory-driven transition toward radically lower air and water pollution in industry. This is achieved in the empirical context of the Swedish mining and metals industry, and by investigating the environmental licensing processes during two regulatory systems. The paper derives an analytical framework that explores under what circumstances such licensing processes can result in radical emissions reductions without seriously jeopardizing the competitiveness of the industry. Archived material covering six environmental licensing processes, three during each system, is used to illustrate the various design and implementation issues. The results suggest that regulatorydriven green transitions benefit from trust-based bargaining procedures in which companies are involved in repeated interactions with regulatory authorities, and which extended probation periods permit tests of novel abatement technologies (including innovation). The findings also illustrate the importance of abstaining from simplified normative notions about policy instrument choice (e.g. taxes versus standards).

Decarbonizing the pulp and paper industry: A critical and systematic review of sociotechnical developments and policy options

“…Another emerging concept within the PPI is that of the biorefinery. A biorefinery entails a facility that integrates biomass conversion equipment and processes to produce power, fuels, and chemicals [58,401]. Biorefineries produce low-carbon commodities such as biofuels for transport and can also contribute to low-carbon energy supply, for instance, by feeding electricity and excess heat into the grid [16,39,154,402,403].…”

Follow the genuine leader: The “green imitation”

“…Research by Söderholm et al (2022) into the environmental licensing of the Swedish mining and metals industry under two regulatory systems, suggests that the problem is not regulation per se but the good or bad design of regulation, noting that flexibility in both timeframes and forms of environmental action are fundamental.…”

“…Parallel to the development of technologies to reduce environmental pollution (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017) or improvements in the social indicators of developing countries (Islam et al, 2021), researchers also found displacements of other innovations (Marin, 2014), reduced competitiveness, lower productivity (Oláh et al, 2020), and increasing indirect costs resulting in lower sales and employment (Rubashkina et al, 2015). Research by Söderholm et al (2022) into the environmental licensing of the Swedish mining and metals industry under two regulatory systems, suggests that the problem is not regulation per se but the good or bad design of regulation, noting that flexibility in both timeframes and forms of environmental action are fundamental.…”

Multi-agent behavior strategy game and evolutionary simulation analysis under environmental regulation

“…The problem of environmental pollution control is complicated, and the actual implementation effect is generally the result of a multiparty game in the process of implementing ER. 42 Owing to the different expected benefits faced by enterprises and the government and public, these three entities have conflicting goals, and their game relationships are complicated as well. When each participant puts forth a clear decision, it is easy to restrict and influence the others.…”