The Political Decline of Traditional Ulama in Indonesia

Abstract

Political wisdom in Indonesia has long held that its large mass-based Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are politically influential. Within the current democratizing environment ulama have faced many challenges to their social standing and it is our contention in this article that their socio-political role has been diminished in this environment. In order to gauge this situation, the Asia Foundation, working with Indonesian research organizations, conducted a nation-wide survey to explore the changing ways that these Muslim organizations wield political influence, especially at the local level. The survey results confirm that religious figures, or ulama, within NU and Muhammadiyah, do not wield the same kind of direct political influence as they have historically, but this article also highlights how these leaders are still important power brokers at the local level.

Islamic Organisation and Electoral Politics: Nahdlatul Ulama and Islamic Mobilisation in Indonesia's Local Election

“…Furthermore, owing to the plurality of elite interests, as well as the increased focus on rational and autonomous voting at the grassroots level, the organisation's political activities vary across regions and times. Such diverse political behaviours, however, must not always be understood as a sign of weakened authority in members' eyes or increased power brokerage (as suggested by several previous studies) (Machmudi, 2011;Fealy and Bush, 2014).…”

“…Religion-based political mobilisation in Brebes, particularly the involvement of Islamic organisations in electoral contestations, is not unique, but reflects broader developments in the role of Islamic organisations in local politics in Indonesia (Jung, 2014;Fealy and Bush, 2014). Comparing the political role of NU before and after Reformasi, Fealy and Bush (2014) saw two mutually opposed tendencies: a weakening of the political authority of the kyai (Islamic teachers) even as they are increasingly involved as power brokers at the local level. Although this view has an empirical basis, it seems to reflect the once-common view of the kyai as cultural brokers in Indonesia (Geertz, 1960).…”

Rational Jihad: Measuring Rationality of Jihad Resolution

“…According to Greg Fealy, NU's attitude was in harmony with his understanding of Islamic law [9]. As Sunni believers, NU believed that the previous Dutch and Japanese governments, although not Muslims, must be obeyed because of their legitimate military power, administering orderly government, and not arbitrarily interfering in religious affairs.…”

“…The story of Imam Syafi'i and Imam Hambali in the court of mihnah in the time of the Caliph Al-Ma'mun (w.833) exhibited how the attitude of the graceful Imam Syafi'i made him safe from prison so that he could continue his preaching in society. While Imam Hambali, who chose to be strictly opposed to the principle of the ruler, did make him a martyr [9].…”

Development, Democracy, and Post-Islamism in Indonesia

“…Being traditionalists, the NU tend to side with the status quo. The ability of its members to eventually penetrate important state bureaucracies and councils ensured its continual presence in national policy-making (Fealy & Bush, 2014). Wahid Hasyim, the son of NU"s founder, was Indonesia"s first Minister of Religious Affairs.…”