The Political Costs of Austerity

Gabriel, Ricardo Duque; Klein, Mathias; Pessoa, Ana

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4160971

Cited by 9 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…This finding, taken together with studies of austerity (e.g. Foster and Frieden, 2019; Gabriel et al, 2022), suggests that voters’ support for globalization may respond more strongly to cuts to compensation than to increases, as anticipated by the theory of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…Hays, 2009;Swank and Betz, 2003) or cuts to spending (e.g. Fetzer, 2019;Foster and Frieden, 2019;Gabriel, Klein, and Pessoa, 2022). In contrast, I examine the electoral consequences of increased compensation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…austerity) (e.g. Gabriel, Klein, and Pessoa, 2022). In contrast, I examine how additional compensation, provided by the EGF, influences protectionist parties' regional vote shares.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ehrlich and Hearn, 2014) or reductions in government spending (e.g. Gabriel et al, 2022). In contrast, I examine how additional compensation, made possible by the EGF, influences protectionist parties' vote shares in trade-exposed regions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The electoral consequences of compensation for globalization

Rickard

2023

European Union Politics

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As opposition to globalization grows, many governments seek policy responses. One response – the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund – provides support to workers in European Union member states who are made redundant as a result of globalization. Proponents argue that by offsetting some of the costs of globalization, the programme may bolster public support for international economic integration and the political parties that support it. I investigate the impact of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund on voters’ support for protectionist political parties using a difference-in-differences research design and official election results at the district and commune level. I also examine individual-level voting data. I find that in regions exposed to rising imports, assistance from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund generates a small decrease in the vote share of one of Europe’s most prominent anti-globalization parties, which ranges in magnitude from 0 to 1.5 percentage points. While consistent with the logic of embedded liberalism, the finding suggests that the theorized connection between compensation and support for globalization may be conditional rather than categorical.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…austerity) (e.g. Gabriel, Klein, and Pessoa, 2022). In contrast, I examine how additional compensation, provided by the EGF, influences protectionist parties' regional vote shares.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The electoral consequences of compensation for globalization

Rickard

2023

European Union Politics

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“…As one of the most influential studies in the literature, Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) measure political fragmentation by creating an index for power dispersion from one-party majority parliamentary government to minority government. Several studies measure political fragmentation by the number of parties in the legislatures (Le Maux et al (2011); Puigmulé-Solà (2020), whereas others use the Herfindahl index of the seat shares of the parties (Köthenbürger et al (2014); Gabriel et al (2022); Meka (2022)). Prieto and Manzano (2004) measure political fragmentation as the availability of majority in parliament and one-party government using dummy variables.…”

Section: Political Fragmentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Revisit to Political Institutions and Inequality

DENIZ,

Stengos

2023

Preprint

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This study revisits the drivers of income inequality with political institutions at the core. We take a multidimensional institutional approach by defining political institutions in terms of governance, political freedom, political fragmentation and political scale. The main contributions of our study are (i) presenting the most extensive analysis up-to-date of the role of political institutions by decomposing it into distinct elements and (ii) considering the difficulty and the lack of consensus and clarity regarding the choice of instruments in the literature we define an alternative methodology to deal with the potential endogeneity of political institutions. We combine an analysis of club convergence, a clustering mechanism according to the long term income trajectories of the countries under investigation with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) within each cluster to determine the most important variables that affect inequality out of a large set of potentially important variables. Our results show that the effectiveness of political institutions differ among country groups and that there is no "one size fits all" policy prescription that links institutional quality and income inequality.

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Fiscal consolidation and voting: on the electoral costs of budgetary stability

Lago‐Peñas,

Cadaval‐Sampedro,

Herrero‐Alcalde

2024

Fiscal Studies

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In this paper, we analyse the potential impact of policies aimed at fostering fiscal sustainability on citizens’ preferences. A survey specifically designed for this purpose quantifies citizens’ knowledge and concern about fiscal imbalances and the institutional framework that addresses them in Spain, and their possible electoral reactions to public spending cuts and tax increases. Using both ordered and unordered multinomial probit models, we corroborate that citizens tend to disapprove of retrenchment policies. However, the effect on citizens’ voting intentions varies depending on their political ideology. We confirm that left‐wing voters supporting the incumbent coalition parties prefer austerity policies based on the revenue side of the budget, while right‐wing voters tend to approve retrenchments based on the expenditure side to a larger extent.

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The Political Costs of Austerity

Cited by 9 publications

References 38 publications

The electoral consequences of compensation for globalization

The electoral consequences of compensation for globalization

A Revisit to Political Institutions and Inequality

Fiscal consolidation and voting: on the electoral costs of budgetary stability

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