The Political Consequences of Germany's Mixed‐Member System: Personalization at the Grass Roots?

Klingemann, Hans‐Dieter; Weßels, Bernhard

doi:10.1093/019925768x.003.0014

Cited by 76 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 156 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The German electoral system is the prototype of a mixed electoral system that combines regional closed-list PR with a nominal plurality vote in singlemember districts (Nohlen 1978;Klingemann and Wessels 2001;Scarrow 2001;Shugart and Wattenberg 2001;Saalfeld 2005). About half of the seats of the German parliament, the Bundestag, are assigned to candidates who gain a relative majority of 'direct' (nominal) votes in one of the -currently -299 single-member electoral districts.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral rules and legislative turnover: Evidence from Germany's mixed electoral system

Manow¹

2007

West European Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral rules and legislative turnover: Evidence from Germany's mixed electoral system

Manow¹

2007

West European Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The larger the constituency area, the more regional issues they could focus on. At times this would result in a personalized campaign that emphasizes on local advocacy performance or local issues that are not covered in the party programme (Klingemann and Wessels, 2001). Because of the low-salience environment, every extra mile canvassed in such a personalized campaign could have a significant marginal impact on the candidate's electoral prospect, thus the previous calculus of campaign costs may not apply to this level of elections.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the growing literature on decentralized personalization, we could deduce that regional or local campaigns have quite different degrees of personalization (Klingemann and Wessels, 2001;Zittel and Gschwend, 2008;Cross and Young, 2015). However, regions are never homogeneous.…”

Section: Institutional Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The territoriality of personalization: New avenues for decentralized personalization in multi-level Western Europe

Chan

2017

Regional & Federal Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In light of the increasing scholarly attention to the concept of decentralized personalization, this paper argues that the territoriality (the level of government to which an MP belongs) of an MP would also lead to variations in that MP's incentive to personalize their campaigns. Using data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP survey, this paper tests the role of the territoriality of an MP in their incentive to personalize their campaigns across nine multilevel countries in Western Europe. Although the level of personalization of campaigns does differ according to territoriality, the underlying explanatory variables do not behave uniformly across territoriality. This paper thus draws attention to the rarely explored role of territory, and the complications it may bring to the explanation of the personalization of politics.

show abstract

“…Comparing with ticket-splitting under the MMP systems in Germany and New Zealand, the patterns of split-ticket voting in Japan and in Taiwan are not unique. Indeed, the proportion of German ticket-splitters has increased from 4.3% in 1953, when the country adopted the MMP system, to 22.1% in 1998 Kingemann and Wessels 2001). New Zealand also witnessed 37% of its voters splitting their ballots in the country's irst parliamentary election under the MMP rules (Johnston and Pattie 2002;Barker et al 2001).…”

Section: Split-ticket Voting In Japan and Taiwanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

show abstract

The Political Consequences of Germany's Mixed‐Member System: Personalization at the Grass Roots?

Cited by 76 publications

References 156 publications

Electoral rules and legislative turnover: Evidence from Germany's mixed electoral system

Electoral rules and legislative turnover: Evidence from Germany's mixed electoral system

The territoriality of personalization: New avenues for decentralized personalization in multi-level Western Europe

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About