The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards

Abstract

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of coordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop 'best practices' and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards. policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop "best practices" and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms, and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this article, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards.

The drivers of regulatory networking: policy learning between homophily and convergence

“…The model developed in this article is aimed at explaining that structure. The literature on European Regulatory Networks (key contributions include Coen and Thatcher 2008;Eberlein and Newman 2008;Kelemen and Tarrant 2011;Levi-Faur 2011;Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and more generally on networks of regulators of network industries has, thus far, scarcely relied on the richness of insight that network theory and network analysis could afford it. In other words, the literature has often used the term "network" without using the methods pertaining to the quantitative analysis of networks.…”

Analysis of the efficiency of levers in the context of implementation of the state regulatory policy

“…Maggetti and F. Gilardi (2011) [14,830] define the European Regulatory Network (ERNs) As a main managerial tool for informal coordination of social regulations at the EU level. They argue that the existence of a central network is associated with a faster internal adoption of standards.…”

Filling the Gap in the European Administrative Space: The Role of Administrative Networks in EU Implementation and Enforcement

“…Thus impact concerns the ability of EANs to realize their policy objectives, such as improved national implementation or more harmonized enforcement of EU law. Several authors have documented EANs' role in adopting and promoting common standards at the national level (Maggetti 2014a: 493;Maggetti and Gilardi 2011;Maggetti and Gilardi 2014). Reportedly, this is especially the case for national agencies with network centrality (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and for EANs where supranational actors play a 'nodal role' (Versluis and Tarr 2013).…”

“…Several authors have documented EANs' role in adopting and promoting common standards at the national level (Maggetti 2014a: 493;Maggetti and Gilardi 2011;Maggetti and Gilardi 2014). Reportedly, this is especially the case for national agencies with network centrality (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and for EANs where supranational actors play a 'nodal role' (Versluis and Tarr 2013). EANs are found to be effective in 'closing the existing regulatory lacunae at the European level' (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 106), albeit to varying degrees across member states (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013).…”

“…Second, much is to be gained from behavioural analyses of network functioning, as well as the application of social network analysis, which is highly suited to analyse the extent and antecedents of co-operation and control in networks. This seems especially important because the literature has primarily focused on Commission control, neglecting the question of dominance by powerful national network members (but see Maggetti and Gilardi 2011). Third, the role of the Commission could be studied more extensively; to what extent and under what conditions does it play an effective role of 'teacher of norms' (Versluis and Tarr 2013)?…”