The policy feedback effects of preemption

Abstract

Scholars have charted a dramatic rise in the use of preemption both at the federal and state levels since the 1970s, with courts and politicians from both parties enacting preemptions across a range of contentious issues. Thus, preemption is a critical feature of American policymaking—one that almost certainly shapes the political choices of policymakers, organized interests, and voters across levels of government. Despite its significance to the politics of policymaking, scholars have yet to systematically consider the political consequences of preemption. We apply the logic of policy feedback theory to create a framework for analyzing the political consequences of preemption. Specifically, we detail how the use of both federal‐state and state‐local preemption might produce unique resource and interpretive effects that shape the subsequent political behaviors of policymakers, organized interests, and the public. We then consider two illustrative cases—federal preemption of state consumer financial protections and state preemption of local gender identity anti‐discrimination statutes—to demonstrate our framework's application. The article addresses a gap in the preemption literature and provides a critical extension of policy feedback theory, proposing a research agenda for future work to help better understand the politics of a widely used policy tool.