The Platonic Distinction Between 'True' and 'False' Pleasures and Pains

Joachim, Harold H.

doi:10.2307/2177616

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“…Cependant, ce concept d'objet du plaisir, qui joue un rôle tellement crucial dans les commentaires de ce passage, n'est jamais invoqué explicitement dans l'analyse des plaisirs faux qui suit 13 . Comme nous allons le voir, ce qui est en revanche invoqué comme critère à l'aune duquel la vérité ou la fausseté des plaisirs est évaluée est la condition effective du corps (ou de l'âme) de la personne qui éprouve un plaisir ou une peine, dont la représentation correspond au contenu de ce ce sens est Joachim (1911), dans un article malheureusement très rarement cité (voir en particulier p. 487), mais qui est pourtant, bien qu'il ne se présente pas comme un commentaire explicite des textes platoniciens, d'une remarquable pertinence pour saisir l'enjeu de cette discussion sur les plaisirs faux. Cette interprétation ne doit pas être confondue avec celle de D. Frede, selon laquelle certains plaisirs pourraient être faux parce qu'ils auraient un « contenu propositionnel » (voir en particulier Frede (1985)).…”

Section: F La Vie Dans Les Mélangesunclassified

Le <i>Philèbe</i> de Platon

Delcomminette¹

2006

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Section: F La Vie Dans Les Mélangesunclassified

Le <i>Philèbe</i> de Platon

Delcomminette¹

2006

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Affective phenomena - descriptive and theoretical.

Gardiner¹

1911

Psychological Bulletin

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A comprehensive critical review of work in the field of affective psychology during the ten years, 1900-1909, is given by Kelchner (7), who notices no less than 147 titles, all bearing on fundamental problems. This, not including the Italian literature, fairly represents the present lively interest in the subject. There is little to record of unanimity in results, and tendencies often seem more conflicting than converging. Four leading conceptions of the nature of feeling (including emotion) have been developed, with no agreement as to its criteria. Kelchner reviews the discussion of the peripheral theory in extenso, concluding that while the pathological evidence is ambiguous, investigations into visceral sensibility show that the theory is possible, while no observation obtained by the method of expression refutes its fundamental idea. As to the qualities of feeling, opinion appears on the whole to be against Wundt's tridimensional theory; it is suggested that the proposed new dimensions may be better characterized by relating them to moods than by comparison with simple feelings. A masterly analysis of the entire field of present discussion is also given by Kiilpe (8) in a paper read at the Geneva Congress in 1909. Kiilpe regards 'feeling' as an elementary mental state characterized by (a) universality of the stimuli,-anything can produce it, and (Z>) actuality,-it is always capable of being realized. These marks, he holds, are only found combined in pleasantness and unpleasantness; Wundt's proposed additions he takes as general sensations and the so-called intellectual feelings as conceptual marks of the object and general unanalyzable impressions. The admitted qualities are always identical, but may be variously classified as particular and general, active and passive, etc. The most noteworthy feature of Kiilpe's paper is his attempt to classify and analyze the various methods of investigating feeling. All are complex and relate as well to the production of the impression as to the subjective state of the observer. Kiilpe enumerates the elements of procedure in each group of methods, and finds, e. g., no fewer than fourteen such particulars in the methods of registering the reactions. Experimentalists will take note of this analysis as both serving to re-establish synthetically the old and leading to new methods of research. The general nature of affective consciousness is also the

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The Platonic Distinction Between 'True' and 'False' Pleasures and Pains

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Le <i>Philèbe</i> de Platon

Le <i>Philèbe</i> de Platon

Affective phenomena - descriptive and theoretical.

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