The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy

Abstract

Husserl's phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts (such as remembering) and to any simple form of act modification (such as neutrality modification). First, I unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called "intuitive representations". Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the "Ego-splitting" (Ichspaltung). In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl's phenomenology of imagination.

A Phenomenological Paradigm for Empirical Research in Psychiatry and Psychology: Open Questions

“…Instead, hallucinations would have more to do with the phenomenology of fantasy, whose distinctive character is to "re-present" an object of perception that is not directly present, but absent from the actual field of perception. According to Cavallaro (2017), it is not the presentation/ re-presentation dichotomy, but what Husserl calls "ego-splitting" (Ichspaltung) that is crucial to distinguishing when experiencing the "quasi perception" produced by fantasy and not a perception as such. Ego-splitting makes possible the experience of the "as if " fictive character of self-awareness when fantasizing.…”

Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions

“…In the previous sections we discussed some points which address the problem of distinguishing fictional from ordinary emotions.23 For a general discussion of the phenomenon of ego-splitting in pure phantasy cf Cavallaro (2017)…”