The phenomenology of propositional attitudes

Abstract

Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent.

Happiness, Dispositions and the Self

“…But it is possible that some dispositional states do have a distinctive phenomenology (though this may better be seen as an accompanying categorical state). Being irritable or cheerful may have a certain feel of to it (Klausen 2008;cf. also Feldman 2010, p. 142).…”

“…be in a state of hate both by being disposed to react in a certain way towards a person and by having an actual feeling of hatred. I shall commit myself as little as possible to any specific account of the mental states in question (but see Klausen 2008;2013) and simply assume the standard view that moods and emotions have both dispositional and occurrent aspects, and possibly also come in both dispositional and occurrent forms.…”

“…However, a majority of philosophers of mind seem to think that conscious states are necessarily phenomenal (Strawson 1994;Siewert 1998;Levine 2001;Dainton 2008;Farkas 2008;Kriegel 2009). For a defence of the view that propositional attitudes have a distinctive phenomenal character (see Klausen 2008). positive emotional condition (Haybron 2008, Ch. 4-7).…”

Fenomenologia cognitiva

“…Altres autors s'han centrat en els actes o actituds proposicionals. Brown (2007), per exemple, defensa la idea que hi ha un sentiment de convicció o certesa associat al jutjar, i d'altres defensen la visió que les actituds proposicionals tenen un caràcter fenomènic específic (Klausen 2008;Jorba 2016). Visions contràries també han estat expressades per Prinz (2007;) i Robinson (2005, per exemple, argumentant que el que explica la fenomenologia de les actituds és la fenomenologia del desig i del dubte, i/o algunes formes d'emocions i sentiments epistèmics com ara la curiositat o la confusió, i que aquests episodis no es poden considerar com a part de la fenomenologia cognitiva específica.…”

Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of ‘Off-Line Thinking’

“…2 Although currently less dominant, non-reductive views of phenomenal consciousness, which are more compatible with a Husserlian position, have also received considerable attention and have in some cases even involved arguments for the inverse dependence of intentionality on phenomenal consciousness (Fasching 2012;Klausen 2008;Pitt 2004;McGinn 2004;Loar 2003;Horgan and Tienson 2002;Siewert 1998;Strawson 1994Strawson , 2004Searle 1992).…”