The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework

Abstract

After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through which the phenomenology of action is generated and the processes involved in the specification and control of action are strongly interconnected. I argue in favor of a three-tiered dynamic model of intention, link it to an expanded version of the internal model theory of action control and specification, and use this theoretical framework to guide an analysis of the contents, possible sources and temporal course of complementary aspects of the phenomenology of action.

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

“…Our observation that neonatal arm movements are a basic, primary form of intended action has important bearing on understanding the development of agency and intentionality. It stands in agreement with a growing philosophical psychological account that basic, embodied intentions are part‐and‐parcel of the core sense of self (Alcaro, Carta, & Panksepp, 2017; Delafield‐Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Fuchs & Koch, 2014; Gallagher, 2000, 2005; Hohwy, 2007; Merker, 2007; Northoff & Panksepp, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Stern, 2010; Trevarthen & Delafield‐Butt, 2017; Zahavi, 2005, 2006). This non‐verbal modality of expressive gesture made in communication with a caring and attentive other underpins preverbal, embodied intersubjective communication important for psychological development and health (Delafield‐Butt & Trevarthen, 2015; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2015; Rochat & Gallese, 2016; Trevarthen et al., 2015) and, in cases where the infant's mental health or development is threatened, may require professional assistance to support (Brazelton, 2006).…”

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

“…That is, besides the sense of ownership, we also experience intentional movements as realisations of our agency (Bayne, 2008;Pacherie, 2008). It is through our body that we move and act, feed ourselves and satisfy our needs, and more abstractly, satisfy our drives and motivation.…”

The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns

“…(a) the goal state [or the end target position for the body also called a ''motor intention" or M-intention by Pacherie (2008).] This represents a target position of the body; (b) the motor commands, of which there are two copies, produced by the so called 'inverse model'.…”