The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector

Abstract

Nowadays,statesspendmoreattention,time,andmoneyonperformancemeasurement and evaluation in the public sector than ever before (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 87; Power, 1997). Results-based management is the talk of the day at all levels of the public sector: local, regional, national, and even supra national. Schools and universities, local governments, and other administrative agencies, also developmental aid organizations (nongovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations) and organizations such as the World Bank, are all involved in producing data and information on performance results and-if possible-impact. Power (1994, 1997, 2000) even refers to the "audit explosion" or the "audit society." Believers in New Public Management (NPM) attribute a high priority to measuring output and outcomes and aim to base their new policies and management activities on this type of information-ideally meant to make policy implementation more efficient and effective. However, evaluation studies show that many attempts to introduce results-based management are still unsuccessful (see, for example, Leeuw & Van Gils, 1999, for a review of Dutch studies). Nevertheless, the need for measuring output, outcomes, and evaluation activities remains an important element in statements by politicians and administrators focused on improving government's performance. Below, we will argue that this increase of output measurement in the public sector can lead to several unintended consequences that may not only invalidate conclusions on public sector performance but can also negatively influence that performance. We will show that a number of characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using performance indicators, illustrated by different examples. Finally, we will conclude with some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of performance assessment in the public sector. We believe this question is important

Organisational climate from view point of motivation in district hospital, India

“…This motive is dysfunctional and indicates that order is maintained in the DH; such a score displays personal power; characterization of a beaurocratic organisation. The dominance of Control climate in the public sector has been reported by Sandra and Frans [26].…”

Mål eller kaos? - Muligheder og begrænsning i at indføre "performance management" i danske idrætsfaciliteter

“…En risiko ved at fokusere på aktivitetsniveauet er, at idraetsfacilitetens ledelse så vil fokusere på det, der i litteraturen betegnes 'cherry-picking' (Thiel & Leeuw, 2002) og vil forsøge at øge aktivitetsniveauet ved at fokusere på de bedst fungerende og enkleste kunder at håndtere. Det kan fx vaere visse velfungerende foreninger eller kommercielle aktører, som nok fører meraktivitet og merindtjening (direkte og i form af tilskud) med sig, men som er ressourcestaerke aktører, der fortraenger andre og mindre ressourcestaerke aktører.…”

De beste de baas? : Verdienste, respect en solidariteit in een meritocratie

“…Onder bestuurskundigen wordt veel geschreven over de techniek en de onbedoelde gevolgen van meten in organisaties, zoals tunnelvisie (beperking van het beleid tot de afgesproken indicatoren en veronachtzaming van andere doelen), myopia (een overdaad aan informatie door een te veel aan indicatoren) en de performance paradox ( Van Thiel en Leeuw 2002, Power 2001. Doel van zulke kritiek is doorgaans om de negatieve gevolgen van het meten zo veel mogelijk te beperken en de meettechnieken te verfijnen, opdat prestaties zo nauwkeurig mogelijk gemeten worden met een minimum aan ruis.…”