The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector

Abstract

Nowadays,statesspendmoreattention,time,andmoneyonperformancemeasurement and evaluation in the public sector than ever before (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 87; Power, 1997). Results-based management is the talk of the day at all levels of the public sector: local, regional, national, and even supra national. Schools and universities, local governments, and other administrative agencies, also developmental aid organizations (nongovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations) and organizations such as the World Bank, are all involved in producing data and information on performance results and-if possible-impact. Power (1994, 1997, 2000) even refers to the "audit explosion" or the "audit society." Believers in New Public Management (NPM) attribute a high priority to measuring output and outcomes and aim to base their new policies and management activities on this type of information-ideally meant to make policy implementation more efficient and effective. However, evaluation studies show that many attempts to introduce results-based management are still unsuccessful (see, for example, Leeuw & Van Gils, 1999, for a review of Dutch studies). Nevertheless, the need for measuring output, outcomes, and evaluation activities remains an important element in statements by politicians and administrators focused on improving government's performance. Below, we will argue that this increase of output measurement in the public sector can lead to several unintended consequences that may not only invalidate conclusions on public sector performance but can also negatively influence that performance. We will show that a number of characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using performance indicators, illustrated by different examples. Finally, we will conclude with some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of performance assessment in the public sector. We believe this question is important

Who Cares: Stakeholder Participation and the Use of Performance Information in Strategic Planning

“…On one hand, measurement mechanisms provide systematic and useful information to inform citizens' involvement in strategic planning (Ho & Coates, 2004;Yang & Holzer, 2006). On the other hand, government authorities need performance information to establish a positive image of governmental reform (Moynihan, 2008); performance data is helpful in reflecting governmental effectiveness (Coutry & Marschke, 2004;Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Citizens cannot form perceptions of governmental performance without performance information (Berman 1997;Bok, 1997;Weil, 1989;Glaser & Denhardt, 2000).…”

Through A Glass, Darkly: Understanding the Effects of Performance Regimes

“…Agents may game program indicators through a variety of tactics, including making up data, creaming easy-to-serve clients, changing performance goals to limit comparison across time, or manipulating measures (Coutry & Marschke, 2004;van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002).…”

Policy incentives in Canadian large-scale assessment: How policy levers influence teacher decisions about instructional change

“…Public service performance targets can also lead to gaming behaviours, as examined by Hood (2006) in the UK. Manipulation of metrics is 'the performance paradox' explained by Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) or the 'choreographed performances' noted by Webb (2006). Whatever term is used, they are known to create distortions of reality when the performance metrics are known.…”