The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget

Jochimsen, Beate; Thomasius, Sebastian

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.11.002

Cited by 79 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…). Political experience and party rank are crucial for ministerial efficiency in parliamentary democracies (Alexiadou ; Jochimsen & Thomasius ). Moreover, Europeans mostly overcame the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s through political battles and alliances (Gourevitch ; Hall ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Alexiadou

Günaydın

2019

European J Political Res

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Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non‐elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro‐market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer‐term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi‐presidential European democracies this article shows that commitment, not expertise is the primary driver of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of the findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short‐lived and not recurring.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Alexiadou

Günaydın

2019

European J Political Res

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“…Using data over the period 1960–2009, previous studies did not show that government ideology influenced deficits in the German states (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, ; Jochimsen and Thomasius, ). Other studies have shown evidence for ideology‐induced policies in the German states since the 1990s: rightwing governments hired more policemen than leftwing governments; rightwing governments were active in introducing tuition fees while leftwing governments abolished tuition fees; rightwing governments spent more on universities; rightwing governments promoted economic freedom (Kauder and Potrafke, ; Oberndorfer and Steiner, ; Potrafke, , ; Tepe and Vanhuysse, ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Debt Brakes in the German States: Governments’ Rhetoric and Actions

Potrafke

Riem

Schinke

2016

German Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Primary deficits, however, hardly differed under leftwing and rightwing governments. Revenues of federal taxes were much higher than expected and facilitated budget consolidation. Leftwing governments did not need to run deficits to design generous budgets. It is conceivable that parties confirmed their identity by using expressive rhetoric, but responded to shifts in public opinion after the financial crisis and pursued more sustainable fiscal policies when in office. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-codes: D720, H600, H720.

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“…Jochimsen and Nuscheler () and Jochimsen and Thomasius (), however, do not find partisan effects at the German state level.…”

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confidence: 88%

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

Roesel

2017

Fiscal Studies

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In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.

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The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget

Cited by 79 publications

References 72 publications

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Debt Brakes in the German States: Governments’ Rhetoric and Actions

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

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