The Pendulum of Majoritarianism: Turkey’s Governmental Self-Identity and Turkish–Egyptian Relations

Abstract

Turkey’s relations with Egypt abruptly hit rock bottom following the Egyptian army’s ousting of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Despite significant political fluctuations between the two countries, there is a gap in academic literature about addressing alterations in Turkish–Egyptian relations holistically. To this end, this article proposes that Turkey’s volatile relationship with the Egyptian governments since the so-called Arab Spring is partially a reflection of broader institutional changes in Turkey’s domestic settings. One of these salient changes is the discursive transformation of Turkish national self-perception. This article shows how Turkey’s new governmental self-understanding of “majoritarianism” manifests in its relations with Egypt. It asserts that this transformation in the governmental perception of the national-self made Turkey’s policies on Egypt, which oscillate between one extreme to another, “conceivable/thinkable” via the medium of national identity discourses. It shows the interplay between the governmental identity discourses of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) elites and Turkey’s policies on Egypt in the institutional/non-discursive foreign policy field.

The “glitch” of Rabia monuments: a semiotic analysis of July 15 monuments in Turkey

“…According to Tetik (2021), transferring the party salute from the Muslim Brothers demonstrated how the AKP identifies its ideological position with that of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. After the death of former president Morsi during a court trial in 2019, Erdogan called President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi a "murderer" and "cruel," and made an analogy between himself and the deceased Morsi, declaring him a "martyr.…”

“…According to Tetik (2021), transferring the party salute from the Muslim Brothers demonstrated how the AKP identifies its ideological position with that of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. After the death of former president Morsi during a court trial in 2019, Erdoğan called President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi a “murderer” and “cruel,” and made an analogy between himself and the deceased Morsi, declaring him a “martyr.” The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs furthered this narrative, declaring that “Martyr Mohammed Morsi will be always remembered as an exceptional personality in his country’s fight for democracy.”…”

“…After September 2021, Erdoğan stopped using the controversial Rabia salute, a move that was interpreted by oppositional media as a signal of improving relations with Egypt (Cumhuriyet 2021; Gazete Duvar 2021). According to Tetik (2021), this is a rhetorical entrapment because while the AKP government tries to protect Turkish national interests (energy fields in the eastern Mediterranean, military engagement in Syria and Libya), it also tries to continue with its identity narratives regarding Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood (i.e., the analogy between the 2013 Egyptian military coup and the 2016 Turkish coup attempt).…”