The Passing of the Aristocracy: Jefferson's Removal of the Federalists, 1801-1805

Prince, Carl E.

doi:10.2307/1917975

Cited by 16 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Customs collectors, inspectors, marshals, and several other district attorneys were removed without cause. When it came to Harison, however, Jefferson identified him as a “Tory.” It was a dishonor he reserved for very few other appointees (Prince 1970, 572). Reintegration may have had limits.…”

Section: Washington's Loyal Lawyers: Restoring Dignities In the Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exile, Choice, and Loyalism: Taking and Restoring Dignity in the American Revolution

Hulsebosch¹

2016

Law soc. inq.

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Taking a cue from Bernadette Atuahene's concept of “dignity takings” and her insight that government expropriation inflicts more than economic injury, this essay analyzes how American revolutionaries defined political membership, penalized and expropriated British loyalists, and then allowed some to join the American polity in the decade after the Revolution. Many recovered their property, professions, and legal privileges. However, because most loyalists could choose to remain loyal or join the Revolution, they did not lose human dignity as Atuahene defines it. Case studies of two reintegrating lawyers, Richard Harison and William Rawle, explore loyalism, the loss of dignities that loyalists suffered, and some paths toward reintegration. Their appointment as federal attorneys helped make the government conversant in the common law, British statutes, and the law of nations, which in turn supported the Federalist goal of reintegrating the United States into the Atlantic World: achieving, in other words, national dignity.

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Section: Washington's Loyal Lawyers: Restoring Dignities In the Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exile, Choice, and Loyalism: Taking and Restoring Dignity in the American Revolution

Hulsebosch¹

2016

Law soc. inq.

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“…Although the emergence of political parties had not fully occurred until late in Washington's administration, Jefferson adopted the practice of nominating people who were in general agreement with the administration in power. He also instituted the country's first removal effort, which served to rid the departments of Federalist party holdovers and provided offices for loyal Republican party members (Prince 1970, 565). Presidents James Madison and James Monroe continued the practice of consulting friendly congressmen.…”

Section: A Brief History Of the Prenomination Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Law: The President “Shall Nominate”: Exclusive or Shared Constitutional Power?

Sollenberger

2006

Pres Stud Q

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The power to nominate has often been a delicate issue to analyze. No doubt the Constitution gives to the president the ability to make formal nominations, but the question lingers as to whether or not the Senate can involve itself before that decision is made. This article examines the advice and consent clause through a constitutional, historical, and institutional perspective to address this question. Saying that the president has the final judgment in nominating does not preclude the Senate (or even the House of Representatives) from giving counsel during the decision‐making process for selecting a nominee. A president, however, may well decide to ignore congressional advice, but he should be mindful of the fact that the Constitution gives to the Senate the ability to reject his nominations and block other White House objectives, including legislation and treaties.

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“… 27 For instance, of the 20 federal marshals, in charge of empaneling both grand and petit juries, Jefferson replaced 18; of the 21 U. S. Attorneys, responsible for federal prosecutions and related investigations in their states, Jefferson would change 13 by the end of his first term (Prince 1970). …”

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confidence: 99%

Cold Case File: Indictable Acts and Officer Accountability inMarbury v. Madison

Orren

Walker

2013

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Starting from the position that officer accountability is a core value of American constitutionalism, this article reassesses Marbury v. Madison in light of the indictable acts connected to the nondelivery of Marbury's commission. First, it reads Chief Justice Marshall's opinion against the background of personal and political hostility among the principals, including between Marbury and President Jefferson. Second, it identifies avenues of further redress open to Marbury before and after the Supreme Court's refusal of the mandamus order, and it considers why they were not pursued. Finally, having identified alternative procedural traditions on which Marshall could have drawn, and reviewed decisions by state and federal judges in analogous suits against officers, it concludes that Marbury's deepest contribution was to elevate the principle of jurisdiction over the imperative of remedy in constitutional decision making.

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The Passing of the Aristocracy: Jefferson's Removal of the Federalists, 1801-1805

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Exile, Choice, and Loyalism: Taking and Restoring Dignity in the American Revolution

Exile, Choice, and Loyalism: Taking and Restoring Dignity in the American Revolution

The Law: The President “Shall Nominate”: Exclusive or Shared Constitutional Power?

Cold Case File: Indictable Acts and Officer Accountability inMarbury v. Madison

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