The Party-Military Connection: A Critique

Introduction to the Research Handbook on Civil–Military Relations

“…Beliefs can also be rooted in ideology, as the communist regimes aptly demonstrated for much of the twentieth century (Barany, 2012). By practicing what Huntington called subjective civilian control, the ruling elites of communist states maintained firm control over their armed forces through political indoctrination, resulting in their unconditional allegiance to the Communist party (Colton, 1979;Odom, 1978;Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982).…”

How the Party Commands the Gun: The Foreign–Domestic Threat Dilemma in China

“…Crucially, the system of political commissars and intelligence officers embedded in military units allows elites to monitor the officer corps for party loyalty. As Odom argues, the ruling party's “control apparatus within the military provides an alternative information channel to the top… mak[ing] collusion among [officers] risky” (1978, 37). Yet even a politically tamed military can become an important tool in political struggles within the elite coalition.…”

“…In revolutionary regimes like China, the military may be called on “to settle inner‐party conflicts by force of arms” (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982, 787), but the military is unlikely to act to replace the party. A lack of party‐military ties increases the risk of a military‐led coup to replace the party, in part because it makes it more difficult for civilians to monitor the political loyalty of officers (Odom 1978, 37). In these cases, reducing the strength or competence of the military may be essential for reducing coup risk, as assumed by the guardianship literature.…”

Defining the Nature and Future of the Party–Military Relations in North Korea

“…This Sondang argument is based on the assumption that the party and the military are not separate institutions, but rather closely interconnected and mutually interpenetrated actors, although the party is superior and directs the military. Following the classical theoretical models of civil–military relations that were designed to analyse the Soviet and other communist systems (e.g., Colton’s participation model and Odom’s interest congruence model), this Sondang argument posits that the two institutions are inseparable and linked through interpersonal and inter-institutional penetration (Colton, 1979; Odom, 1978). Furthermore, all political institutions in a communist political system share the same ideology, norms and political objectives; thus, it would be absurd to expect an institutional conflict between the party and the army.…”