The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania

Abstract

The story of armed resistance to Soviet rule in postwar Lithuania is of interest both to historians and to political scientists. On the one hand, it unveils an important period of modern Lithuanian history and offers a glimpse into the dilemma of East European nationalism, caught between Nazis and Communists in World War II. On the other, it allows an insight into the nature of a movement that seeks to produce political changes by the use of violence. In an age when political practitioners use guerrilla warfare and paramilitary tactics as basic means of struggle for power, justification of a study of partisan movements seems hardly necessary. By showing academic interest, the social scientist merely recognizes their growing practical importance.The Lithuanian partisan resistance to the Soviet regime now can be analyzed with the help of varied source material, including firsthand testimony of both nationalist and Communist origin.

Selective Leviathans: Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation

“…This drives up the level of state inflicted violence in two ways -first through obvious collateral damage and second through deliberate targeting of the insurgents' material and popular base to "drain the sea" within which they maneuver." 2 Distinguishing insurgents from their support base and from neutral civilians is difficult and can easily result in seemingly indiscriminate violence." 3 This is why attrition strategies like those pursued by the French in Algeria, U.S. in Vietnam, or the Soviets in Afghanistan may at times seem indistinguishable from "collective punishment" and broach mass killing levels of violence, even if the objective is not cleansing or democide.…”

“…What has not been seriously considered is how the relative importance of territory and the type of state political authority wielded over that region, its "political topography," might incent or constrain the type of state response to rebellion. 2 The core group is "the members of the ruling political organization that has the military and administrative capacity to enforce its decisions within the borders of the state." See Mylonas, 2013, p. 23.…”

“…As the Baloch chief minister was trying to raise the presence of ethnic Baloch in the state security forces, Bhutto may have orchestrated both the Las Bela and Iraq embassy incidents to precipitate military action, consolidate political authority over the province, and distract the chief institutional rival of the military all in one fell swoop. 2 …”

“…One puzzling empirical pattern is how often states seem to defy normative, political, or strategic incentives and choose costly, heavy-handed strategies producing high levels of violence and civilian casualties. Recent work finds that only eleven percent of 20th century counterinsurgency campaigns sought to protect civilians 2 and even incumbents that provided the model for Western counterinsurgency doctrine regularly departed from strategies of minimal force. 3 One need look no further than cases of the Sudanese, Sri Lankan, and Syrian states' recent tilts with insurgencies to recognize the frequency of this phenomena even in the 21st century as well as the high risks and costs of such ventures.…”

“…Second, the theory argues that state incumbents facing rebellion will be unconstrained and willing to employ greater violence against peripheral identity groups that are of low worth and un-embedded within state institutions, but will be much more circumspect against identity groups part of or close to the "core group," possessing high worth and embedded in state institutions. 2 This chapter lays out the core-periphery theory's specific hypotheses on strategy and specific mechanism that link territory and identity to a counterinsurgent's use of effort and violence. Section two provides some initial background and context to the theory.…”