2001
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.259959
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Parliament as Partner: A Century of Constitutional Review

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
6
0

Year Published

2002
2002
2012
2012

Publication Types

Select...
5
4
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 19 publications
(6 citation statements)
references
References 28 publications
0
6
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Constitutions lie beyond the reach of the executive and legislative branches because they bind everyone and can be amended only by invoking special procedures designed to make change difficult. For example, the Australian Constitution provides that it “shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth,” and constitutional change requires popular referendum with a demanding double majority requirement (Saunders, ) . In this way a written constitution “is designed to be an anchor in the past … it creates rules that bind until a supermajority of the living changes them” (Easterbrook, : 363).…”
Section: Freedom Of Action In the Domestic Spherementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Constitutions lie beyond the reach of the executive and legislative branches because they bind everyone and can be amended only by invoking special procedures designed to make change difficult. For example, the Australian Constitution provides that it “shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth,” and constitutional change requires popular referendum with a demanding double majority requirement (Saunders, ) . In this way a written constitution “is designed to be an anchor in the past … it creates rules that bind until a supermajority of the living changes them” (Easterbrook, : 363).…”
Section: Freedom Of Action In the Domestic Spherementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Switzerland and Australia, two majorities are also required for the approval of certain laws: a majority of all voters and a majority of states. The main argument in Australia and Switzerland for using such rules is to protect minorities (see, e.g., Feld andKirchgässner 1998 andSaunders 2001 for a recent survey).…”
Section: Double Majority Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, a greater ability to look beyond party-political stereotypes and short-term political gains has been identified as an important need in all debates on constitutional development (e.g. Saunders 2000). This need clearly applies to questions concerning the relationship between regionalism and federalism under the present Constitution.…”
Section: Deliberative Culturementioning
confidence: 99%