The Parkland Mass Shooting and the Path to Intended Violence: A Case Study of Missed Opportunities and Avenues for Future Prevention

Abstract

The 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida reignited a discourse about safety and prevention that often follows such tragedies. Using a case study approach, we analyze the events leading up to the shooting (via official records from law enforcement and the shooting’s review commission) to identify missed opportunities for intervention, de-escalation, and ultimately prevention. The Path to Intended Violence model is employed to highlight the perpetrator’s escalating behaviors from grievance through the attack itself. The lessons learned then are utilized to offer recommendations for schools and communities seeking to prevent similar mass violence attacks.

Mass Shootings in the United States: Prevalence, Policy, and a Way Forward

“…Indeed, the Parkland shooting was an example of where, had an ERPO law existed, it could have been used to prevent the shooting. While the perpetrator did not have a criminal history, he was known to law enforcement and had made numerous threats of violence, including repeated statements that he intended to commit a school shooting (Pallin et al 2021; Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022). The perpetrator also had a history of suicidal ideation and attempts, homicidal ideation, and a fascination with firearms, all of which were warning signs that he may commit a violent act (Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022).…”

“…While the perpetrator did not have a criminal history, he was known to law enforcement and had made numerous threats of violence, including repeated statements that he intended to commit a school shooting (Pallin et al 2021; Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022). The perpetrator also had a history of suicidal ideation and attempts, homicidal ideation, and a fascination with firearms, all of which were warning signs that he may commit a violent act (Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022). Without an ERPO law, however, there was no legal mechanism in Florida to prevent him from purchasing or possessing firearms.…”

“…One considerable challenge to threat assessment and management is the issue of “information silos” (Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022), whereby critical information necessary to identifying, assessing, and managing the threat is not shared among vested stakeholders. This has led to the failure of some mass shootings, such as Parkland, to be prevented even in cases where individuals who had knowledge of the warning signs (e.g., leakage) came forward and reported it.…”

“…Consequently, response practices and harm mitigation should be available for instances where a shooting comes to fruition. Steps have been taken to achieve this end through efforts like target hardening (e.g., entry control and screening) and increasing both natural (e.g., window placement to improve lines of sight) and formal (e.g., police, school resource officers) surveillance (see, generally, Schildkraut, Cowan, and Mosher 2022). Importantly, such efforts must be tailored based on the type of location as they will have different needs as well as environmental challenges.…”

Assessing leakage-based mass shooting prevention: A comparison of foiled and completed attacks.

“…Research has suggested that one reason these shootings occur, despite the offenders’ forewarning is a lack of bystander intervention. Individuals who encountered leakage before the attack failed to report their concerns about the offender because they did not believe the offender’s leakage to be indicative of impending violence, they feared making unnecessary trouble for the offender, or they hesitated to bear the responsibility for reporting (Lankford et al, 2019; Schildkraut et al, 2022; Silva & Greene-Colozzi, 2022b; Silver, 2020).…”