The Paradoxical Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Microstructural Findings

Ekland-Olson, Sheldon; Lieb, John G.; Zürcher, Louis A.

doi:10.2307/3053401

Cited by 57 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Undoubtedly, this reflects the fact that the nonoffenders were less willing to offend under any circumstances-perhaps not only because they were unwilling to accept the risk, but also because they were morally opposed to lawbreaking-while the offenders interpreted risks situationally (Ekland-Olson et al, 1984). While offenders were more likely than controls to indicate that they would commit such offenses, neither group's decisions were significantly affected by the severity of the threatened penalty on its own.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Perceptual Deterrence Among Active Residential Burglars: A Research Note*

1993

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The research reported here is based on a comparison of active residential burglars and a matched control group regarding their willingness to commit a burglary at varying levels of certainty of arrest, severity of penalty, and anticipated reward. Initial analyses revealed that few controls were willing to offend regardless of risk, penalty, or reward and that offenders were not influenced by penalty on its own. Consequently, responses of the oflenders only were further analyzed in relation to the impact of risk, penalty, and reward. The results of a logit analysis indicated that both risk of being caught and prospect of increased gain had a significant influence on the offenders' decision making.Deterrence is essentially a psychological process that involves the balancing of personally held beliefs about possible punishment and anticipated gain. Strictly speaking, then, there can be no direct relationship between sanctions and criminal action; the two must be linked through the intervening variable of subjective perceptions of the risks and rewards of committing an offense (Beyleveld, 1980; Gibbs, 1975). Perceptual deterrence research typically investigates the effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment in preventing criminal behavior. However, this research suffers from a dearth of evidence about known offenders (Paternoster, 1987). In addition, the deterrence models examined usually have been misspecified because they did not include the "positive" side of the deterrence equation-anticipated gain. The calculus of deterrence envisioned by classical theorists such as Bentham (1948)-and extended to contemporary statements of rational choice (Cornish and Clarke, 1986)-sought to find the appropriate balance between punishment and gain to prevent criminal acts from occurring; thus, studies failing The research on which this paper is based was funded by grant 89-1J-CX-0046 from the National Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U S . Department of Justice. We are grateful to Paul Garthwaite, Department of Statistics, University of Aberdeen, for his assistance with the logit analysis and to Richard Rosenfeld for his helpful comments on the manuscript.CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 31 NUMBER 1 1993 135 1. A larger sample obviously would have reduced the chances of making a type I1 error. Given the difficulties of recontacting active offenders, however, obtaining such a sample was patently impractical.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Perceptual Deterrence Among Active Residential Burglars: A Research Note*

1993

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Typically, thieves portray their crimes as particular expressions of a temporarily attractive outlook rather than as isolated choices or stable predisposition toward offending (Eckland-Olson, Lieb, and Zurcher 1984;Shover 1996). In periods when offenders cast off responsibility and other interference with parties, illicit pro ts, and escapist pleasures, crime occurs.…”

Section: Lifestyle and Outlookmentioning

confidence: 99%

sprees and runs: opportunity construction and criminal episodes

Hochstetler¹

2002

Deviant Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Criminal decision-makin g researchers generally focus either on offenders' criteria for identifyin g promising targets or on how offenders' lifestyles condition crime's appeal. Obviously, signi cant events bridge offenders' routines and discrete criminal choices. However, researchers often neglect the immediate experiences and events that enact lifestyles in particular choices. Drawing on 110 accounts of criminal events by street thieves, this article examines criminal choice. The ndings indicate that offenders assess opportunity in light of recent decisions and events. Like all agents, they reference a general outlook and lessons taken from recent choices; looking backward as well as forward, they frame their options within a line of relevant events. When offenders confront potentially criminal situations or promising targets, perceptual outcomes of recent crimes operate alongside a temporary sense of commitment to criminal trajectories of action to inspire a serendipitous optimism. This complex decisionmaking can happen in an instant and is imperceptible without asking offenders to re ect on the sequential events that precede crime.

show abstract

“…This mixed evidence can occur for many different reasons, starting from measurement errors in the empirical analysis, to a social sanctions approach of deterrence (Ekland‐Olson, Lieb & Zurcher 1984), and the impact of personal and social norms as moderators of deterrence (Wenzel 2004). It can, however, also be explained on the basis of crowding theory.…”

Section: The Psychological Tax Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

2007

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. Moreover, friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance. Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological University of Zurich AbstractIn this paper, we develop the concept of a psychological tax contract that goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. Based on crowding theory, the impact of deterrence and rewards on tax morale is discussed. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract partner, sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state increases tax compliance. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to their tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. At the procedural level, a friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.

show abstract

The Paradoxical Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Microstructural Findings

Cited by 57 publications

References 27 publications

Perceptual Deterrence Among Active Residential Burglars: A Research Note*

Perceptual Deterrence Among Active Residential Burglars: A Research Note*

sprees and runs: opportunity construction and criminal episodes

Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About