The Paradox of German Power

Kundnani, Hans

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245504.001.0001

Cited by 67 publications

(33 citation statements)

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“…Germany is also a major investor in the UK car industry with a very healthy trade balance in pharmaceuticals, machine building and electronics (Turner & Green 2017). In recent years a number of authors, notably Hans Kundnani (2014), have argued that German external preferences are essentially set by its export-oriented firms.…”

Section: The Economics Of Brexitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brexit and Beyond

2018

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For our families -British and European alike vii AcknowledgementsThis book would never have seen the light of day without the assistance, support and advice offered to us by our colleagues and friends at UCL and UCL Press.Our colleagues at the UCL European Institute offered help and advice from the moment we started working on the project. In particular we would like to thank Claudia Sternberg, Christine Reh, Piet Eeckhout and Richard Bellamy, who were instrumental in drumming up support for the project within the European Studies community, and whose efforts ensured the final product would be comprehensive in its coverage of the discipline. We are also much indebted to Oliver Patel for his tireless administrative and intellectual support, both on the book itself and on the various other projects the writing of the volume foisted upon him. We would also like to thank the members of the European Institute's Advisory Board, who followed the book's progress with much interest and encouraged us that there was substantial demand for such a volume in the policy world. The Chair of the Board, Sir John Birch, is particularly deserving of our gratitude for his longstanding commitment to the work of the European Institute, his keen interest in the volume and his helpful insights on its content and audience.The book has benefited immensely from the helpful staff at UCL Press. We are grateful in particular to Tim Mathews, who first floated the idea of a book on Brexit, and to our editor, Chris Penfold, who has advised on and overseen the process from start to finish. We would also like to thank the two anonymous referees appointed by UCL Press, whose constructive and detailed comments helped us to structure the volume and finesse the arguments therein. Above all, however, we are grateful to all of our contributing authors, who have lent their expertise and their intellect to this project and whose timely and insightful contributions are the very essence of this book. Finally, AcknowlEdgEMEntS viii we would like to thank our families -to whom we have dedicated this book -for their support and patience over the many months whilst we brought the project together. Chris Bickerton is a Reader in Modern European Politics at CambridgeUniversity, and a Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge. Gráinne de Búrca is the Florence Ellinwood Allen Professor of Law and Faculty Director at the Hauser Global Law School, and Director of the Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law andJustice, at New York University. Michelle Cini is Professor of European Politics and Head of the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol.Deirdre Curtin is Professor of EU Law at the European University Institute in Florence. Helen Drake is Professor of French and European Studies andDirector of the Academy of Diplomacy and International Governance, Loughborough University London.Piet Eeckhout is Professor of EU Law, Dean of the Faculty of Laws, and Academic Director of the European Institute, at...

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Section: The Economics Of Brexitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brexit and Beyond

2018

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“…Continuing the renovation logic, several constitutional changes were enacted, especially in foreign policy towards the East. These included opening diplomatic relations with Romania and Bulgaria and recognizing the Oder-Neisse border line (Garton Ash 1994;Kundnani 2015). 22 While sterilization concerns were not paramount in the major parties' 1966 coalition considerations, some state elections had seen candidates of the radical right National Democratic Party (NPD) elected to state parliaments.…”

Section: The German Warning: Could the Sterilization Cure Become Worsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Jacoby¹

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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Are 'grand coalitions' -coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system -good or bad for democracy? This article analyses that question in light of the recent rise of populist parties that large mainstream parties may try to exclude from government by forming grand coalitions with other large mainstream parties. I call this the 'sterilization' logic and note that mainstream parties' ability to do this varies widely. Where parties have previously used grand coalitions primarily according to a 'clientelistic' logic -for example, Austriamainstream parties may well be unable to rally the party system against insurgent populist challengers. Where mainstream parties have used grand coalitions exceptionally and for major institutional 'renovations' -for example, Germany -the grand coalition remains a viable option for responding to insurgent challenges, though this strategy is also quite risky. This article considers the implications for democracy by tracing recent developments in the context of the euro crisis and the European refugee situation. The major empirical referents are Austria and Germany -two countries with extensive experience and literature about grand coalitions -but the article draws out the implications of the analysis for other European parliamentary contexts.

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“…After initial hesitation, some of the main representatives of German business and industry (notably Markus Kerber, director general of the Federation of German Industries) also supported the government's line, arguing that gross violations of international law could not be tolerated and that peace and freedom stood above economic interests (Forsberg 2016, p. 34). This was particularly significant, as it refuted the argument that German foreign policy towards Russia is determined exclusively by national business interests (Kundnani 2015;Szabo 2015).…”

Section: Ostpolitik Revisited: Agents and Practice Of Germany's Russimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Others have argued that German policy towards Moscow has changed, but 'not as dramatically as some headlines have suggested' (Forsberg 2016, p. 23). At the other end of the spectrum, some pundits have contended that business interests determine German foreign policy, thereby implying that the logic of 'change through economic interlocking' will continue to guide Berlin's relations with Russia (Kundnani 2015;Szabo 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A NewOstpolitik?

Siddi

2016

Europe-Asia Studies

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The Paradox of German Power

Cited by 67 publications

References 0 publications

Brexit and Beyond

Brexit and Beyond

Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A NewOstpolitik?

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