The Paradox of Administrative Decentralization Reform in Young Asian Democracies:South Korea and Indonesia

Abstract

It is generally perceived that administrative decentralization reform in young democracies is a promise to improve democracy from below. Yet, in terms of democratic development, the impact of this process is ambivalent, and can be described as a paradox of reform. This article argues that preemptive countermeasures that offset problems predicted to emerge as the reform proceeds should be formulated as part of the reform through introducing a preventive policy paradigm in the area of democratic reform policy. This is to alleviate or prevent the creation of the paradox and to contribute to democratic development through enhancing people's satisfaction with the newly democratized government. To this end, this study examines administrative decentralization reform in South Korea and Indonesia and uncovers these reforms' paradoxes. These two cases are particularly worthy of study, since their young democratic governments lack countermeasures against predictable reform problems, intensifying the paradox. I argue that the implications drawn from these two cases for methods of enhancing democratic development in other young democracies are worth heeding.

Akselerasi Pembangunan E-Government Di Daerah: Analisis Praktik Baik Pemerintah Kabupaten Sumedang

“…Pemerintah daerah memiliki otonomi yang luas dalam menjalankan urusan di daerah, termasuk dalam meningkatkan pelayanan umum sebagai dampak dari desentralisasi (Heo, 2018). Pemerintah daerah diakui sebagai pihak yang memberikan pelayanan langsung kepada masyarakat, termasuk pelayanan administratif, barang publik, dan jasa publik (Silalahi & Syafri, 2015).…”

Fragile states, decentralisation and the nature of barriers to citizen participation in local government: a view from Pakistan

“…In other words, it can serve as a school of democracy for the common populace by enabling their participation in local development activities (Smith 1985;Wolman 1990;Paul 1987;Rietbergen-McCracken 1996;World Bank 1996;Shah 2006). Even so, it is not realised that many authoritarian regimes introduce decentralisation reforms merely to sustain the central government's inwardly exclusive governmentality, which means its methods of managing society and legitimising its authoritarian raison d'être by excluding individuals and groups which have the potential to oppose the will of the dictatorial government (Khan 2015;Heo 2018;Aslam 2019).…”

“…In the context of Pakistan, however, Aslam (2019) found that dictators could use decentralisation reforms to create a new political support class among the local elites in order to legitimise the central military regime. Another purpose of such authoritarian regimes has been to prevent civil society from challenging them and thus ultimately gaining greater support and thereby sustaining their power by creating inwardly exclusive governmentality (Heo 2018). It is possible to see that there is a trend in other dictatorial regimes such as the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, where decentralisation reforms are implemented in sham and cynical ways (Aslam 2019).…”

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“…The capacity and capability of local governments show unsatisfactory results. Local governments often face several resource constraints, from human resources to infrastructure resources (Heo, 2018;Heywood & Harahap, 2009;Kristiansen & Santoso, 2006;Paramita, Yamazaki, Setiawati, & Koyama, 2018;Shoesmith, Franklin, & Hidayat, 2020). Implementation constraint makes the decentralisation management movement in Indonesia adjust.…”