The paperboys of Russian messaging: RT/Sputnik audiences as vehicles for malign information influence

Wagnsson, Charlotte

doi:10.1080/1369118x.2022.2041700

Cited by 31 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Secondly, adding to previous findings on RT/Sputnik audiences (e.g., Crilley et al, 2020;Wagnsson, 2022), this study finds that the outlets' content was more likely to be consumed by men and that their website/app reach increased substantially in older age groups. Future research could investigate why it is that these groups follow Russian state media more than others.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 65%

“…We know less about their social networking sites' (SNSs) audiences (Crilley et al, 2020;Orttung & Nelson, 2019) and virtually nothing about their website/app audiences. Relevant academic studies that have investigated the outlets' multiplatform audiences (including SNSs and websites/apps) have drawn on either cross-national (see Newman et al, 2020) or national surveys (see Müller & Schulz, 2021;Wagnsson, 2022).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is currently no academic publication that has scrutinized the website/app audiences of RT/Sputnik. Moreover, we know of no cross-nationally comparative research on the demographics of the outlets' audiences (for survey-based national investigations, see Müller & Schulz, 2021;Wagnsson, 2022). Finally, the development of their audiences over time, to our knowledge, has never been investigated in peer-reviewed academic literature.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries

et al. 2022

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Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, policymakers worldwide have taken measures to curb the reach of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik. Mapping the audiences of these outlets in 21 countries, we show that in the quarter before the invasion, at least via their official websites and mobile apps, neither outlet reached more than 5% of the digital populations of any of these countries each month. Averaged across all countries, both outlets’ website and mobile app reach remained approximately constant between 2019 and 2021, was higher for men, and increased with audiences’ age.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 65%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries

et al. 2022

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“…The effects of suppression, in part, will be linked to reputation, with the Russian media’s focus on pathologizing foreign states’ liberal proclivities leading to a perceived degradation of this reputation for citizens of those states – a symbolic threat (Chen et al, 2020). This seems especially likely considering emerging research revealing that RT and Sputnik’s messaging is predominantly sought by more conservative citizens who are already critical of their state’s liberal values (Wagnsson, 2022). This notion of reputation degradation converges with previous assertions by Wagnsson and Barzanje that suppression should trigger “status loss for the readers” (2021, p. 12).…”

Section: Russian Antagonistic Narrative Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive and Emotional Responses to Russian State-Sponsored Media Narratives in International Audiences

Hoyle

Wagnsson

Berg

et al. 2023

Journal of Media Psychology

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Abstract. Russia utilizes state-sponsored news media outlets, such as RT or Sputnik, to project antagonistic strategic narratives into targeted societies and perturb international audiences. While psychological responses to this conduct are frequently assumed, there is a lack of causal evidence demonstrating this. Using a transdisciplinary perspective, we conducted four survey experiments that tested two path models predicting possible cognitive and emotional responses to two narrative strategies that Russian state-sponsored media employ: destruction, which portrays a state as weak and chaotic, and suppression, which portrays a state as indecent and morally deviant. The experiments had between-participant designs, where participants read either an article demonstrating a strategy or a control text, and then indicated their responses to several trust and emotional variables. Participants were either Swedish or Dutch citizens, to build on previous analyses of Russian narration about Sweden and The Netherlands. Path analyses revealed significant differences between the conditions on several response variables. However, we found no evidence that these effects were mediated by generalized realistic or symbolic threat perceptions. We contribute preliminary insights into potential causal links between Russian antagonistic narrative strategies and specific psychological responses. This study, and its overarching research agenda, should have implications for practitioners seeking to counter Russian information influence.

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“…As suggested in extant research, key resources of Russia’s informational influence abroad include Russia’s two official news broadcasters, RT (formerly, Russia Today ) and Sputnik ( Kragh and Asberg, 2017 ; Wagnsson, 2022 ), so-called ‘troll armies’ ( Daucè and Loveluck, 2021 ), social networks ( Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki ; Golova, 2020 ), regional proxy media outlets not openly linked to Russia ( Navumau, 2020 ) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs; Kragh and Asberg, 2017 ). As this overview of the literature illustrates, a broad range of resources for Russia’s foreign communication apparatus have been scrutinised.…”

Section: Russia’s Informational Influence Abroad: Yandex As An Underr...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Different platforms, different plots? The Kremlin-controlled search engine Yandex as a resource for Russia’s informational influence in Belarus during the COVID-19 pandemic

et al. 2023

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Extant research demonstrated that the algorithms of the Kremlin-controlled search engine Yandex, compared to those of its US-based counterpart Google, frequently produce results that are biased toward the interests of Russia’s ruling elites. Prior research, however, audited Yandex’s algorithms largely within Russia. In contrast, this study is the first to assess the role of Yandex’s web search algorithms as a resource for Russia’s informational influence abroad. To do so, we conduct a comparative algorithm audit of Google and Yandex in Belarus, examining the visibility and narratives of COVID-19-related conspiracy theories in their search results. By manually analysing the content of 1320 search results collected in mid-April to mid-May 2020, we find that, compared with Google, (1) Yandex retrieves significantly more conspiratorial content (2) that close to exclusively suspects US plotters to be behind the pandemic, even though the virus spread from the Chinese city of Wuhan across the globe.

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The paperboys of Russian messaging: RT/Sputnik audiences as vehicles for malign information influence

Cited by 31 publications

References 44 publications

Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries

Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries

Cognitive and Emotional Responses to Russian State-Sponsored Media Narratives in International Audiences

Different platforms, different plots? The Kremlin-controlled search engine Yandex as a resource for Russia’s informational influence in Belarus during the COVID-19 pandemic

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