“…For instance, in post-Soviet Russia there have emerged a wide range of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary radically nationalist and often revolutionary groups (Shenfield, 2001), leading numerous observers to compare post-Soviet Russia with the Weimar Republic (Ianov, 1995;Hanson and Kopstein, 1997;Luks, 2008;Kailitz and Umland, 2010). This is in stark contrast to the post-Soviet Ukrainian ultranationalist scene which quickly emerged (Rudling, 2006b(Rudling, , 2012b(Rudling, , 2013), yet has suffered from organizational underdevelopment as well as non-representation in the national parliament except in 2012e2014 (Umland, 2008c(Umland, , 2013bShekhovtsov and Umland, 2013;Shekhovtsov, 2011bShekhovtsov, , 2013Shekhovtsov, , 2014Likhachev, 2013a,b,c;Polyakova, 2014aPolyakova, , 2015c. Why did Russian neo-Nazi skinheads kill, on average, more than one person per week in 2009 (Kozhevnikova, 2010) while their Ukrainian comrades, if we believe the relevant monitoring organizations, did not murder a single person, during the same year (Likhachev, 2010)?…”