The Oslo Accords and Israel–Africa Relations

Abstract

Although previous studies have separately discussed the Oslo Accords and Israel–Africa relations, there has been little discussion of how and why relations between Israel and African countries evolved during the Oslo process and after its collapse. This article addresses these gaps, arguing that although the Oslo Accords did contribute to the establishment of diplomatic relations with many African countries, the contribution was minor and short-lived, and that common and national interests were more central motivations. It describes the complex nature of more recent developments in Israel-African relations and raises questions about the quality and consequences of bilateral relationships rooted mainly in national and common interests.

Foreign aid and bilateral relations: The Israel−East Africa case

“…Israel's one major political interest is to gain diplomatic support in the UN (Gidron, 2020; Salman, 2021). Netanyahu's remarks at a meeting with Israeli representatives in Africa in 2017 leave no doubt regarding Israel's political motives in Africa: “when I put the pyramid of our foreign policy interests in Africa is very high […] the first interest is to dramatically change Africa's voting patterns in the UN and in international bodies from opposition to support” (Israeli PM, 2017a).…”

“…According to Ambassador Masima, “It was our vote that saved Israel.” In this vote, Uganda also abstained (Eichner, 2016; Lazaroff, 2021b; Tzzena, 2016). In addition, in a vote initiated by the United States in 2018 to condemn Hamas, South Sudan voted in favor and Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda abstained (Salman, 2021), and in December 2021 while the General Assembly voted on the resolution which ignored the Jewish people's ties to the Temple Mount, Tanzania was absent and South Sudan and Kenya abstained (Lazaroff, 2021a).…”

“…Ben‐Gurion, for example, saw Ethiopia as part of the “periphery of the Middle East” and saw the potential for a pro‐Israel base on the shores of the Red Sea in a way that considered it as critical among African countries. In fact, Israel invested more in Ethiopia than in any other country around the world (Butime, 2014; Levey, 2004; Salman, 2021). However, the current study does not include other East African countries such as Somalia and Djibouti due to the lack of diplomatic relations with those countries, or Eritrea which has a developing relationship with Israel.…”

The impact of Israel's Sub-Saharan Relations on African Migrants in Israel

“…the mouth to the Red Sea at the Gulf of Aden, the sea route to Israel's harbour at the Red Sea, Eilat, and to Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In Eritrea, Israel operates shipping ports and a monitoring station as part of efforts to stop Iranian arms smuggling to Hamas and Hezbollah (Salman, 2023;Lubotzky & Mehari, 2021).…”

“…But Israel is also a close ally of Ethiopia and one of its main arms suppliers and Tel Aviv backed Addis Ababa in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (Salman, 2021). Also, in the Tigray War (2020-2022), fought in the Tigray Region, bordered by Eritrea to the north, between forces allied to the Ethiopian federal government and Eritrea on one side, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) on the other, Israel and the Gulf states were in a dilemma regarding how to relate to the events in Ethiopia (Salman, 2023). On the one hand, Addis Ababa is a regional ally.…”