Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence 1985
DOI: 10.1515/9781400856121.113
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The Origins of Overkill

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Cited by 10 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…These studies revealed the strong counterforce bias of U.S. strategic doctrine and reinforced the conclusion that limited nuclear exchanges would be difficult if not impossible to control (Rosenberg, 1979(Rosenberg, , 1983Friedberg, 1980;Ball, 1981;Schilling, 1981;Ball and Richelson, 1986;Sagan, 1989). In short, where scholarship in the Golden Age was necessarily abstract and "data-free," the study of nuclear weapons policy during the renaissance rested on a much firmer base of empirical support.…”
Section: New Developments In Security Studiesmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…These studies revealed the strong counterforce bias of U.S. strategic doctrine and reinforced the conclusion that limited nuclear exchanges would be difficult if not impossible to control (Rosenberg, 1979(Rosenberg, , 1983Friedberg, 1980;Ball, 1981;Schilling, 1981;Ball and Richelson, 1986;Sagan, 1989). In short, where scholarship in the Golden Age was necessarily abstract and "data-free," the study of nuclear weapons policy during the renaissance rested on a much firmer base of empirical support.…”
Section: New Developments In Security Studiesmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…Amid the stockpiling of nuclear weapons (Rosenberg, 1983) and cold war posturing for a nuclear war (e.g., Kissinger, 1957), President Eisenhower pursued peaceful alternatives to engage the Soviet Union in cooperative dialogues. He proposed Open Skies in 1955 (Eisenhower, 1955), and when that strategy was unsuccessful, he promoted the Freedom of Space and the launch of scientific satellites during the IGY (National Security Council, 1955a).…”
Section: Balancing Interests Globallymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Extremely offensive strategy is perhaps best illustrated by the development of the Strategic Air Command in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. SACs aircraft inventory, weapons, and planning were gradually changed from the capability to carry out a prolonged air offensive in support of other war efforts to a capability to deliver a one-sortie devastating strike on the Soviet Union and its allies (Rosenberg 1981(Rosenberg , 1983). 3.…”
Section: Under What Conditions Are Choicesmentioning
confidence: 99%