The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts

Rakove, Jack N.

doi:10.2307/1229247

Cited by 37 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Other examples of the limiting power of the Constitution include the separation of powers system that creates multiple vetoes over legislation; the direct taxation clause; 10 and the enumeration of Congress's powers. 11 The framers spent relatively little time during the Constitutional Convention discussing the federal judiciary (McCloskey 2005, 3;Kramer 2006, 705, 738-40), and many scholars suggest that they did not intend to establish judicial review as we understand it today (Farrand 1967, 156-7;Friedman 2009, 36-7;Kramer 2004, 73-92;McCloskey 2005, 4;Rakove 1997Rakove , 1047. But, at a minimum, the framers did suggest that the judicial power together with other features of the Constitution would serve as a limiting force in the new republic (Kramer 2006, 73-8).…”

Section: Constitutional Text and Structure And The Limit Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This dynamic is most clearly understood within the context of the development of federalism and the Court's decisions from 1789 to the Civil War, particularly those consolidating judicial review of congressional and state legislation. Important aspects of the development of judicial review took shape in the context of federalism (Rakove, 1997(Rakove, : 1031. During this period, the allocation of power between the federal government and the states was a perennial source of conflict (McCloskey 2005, 17;Whittington 1999, 76), and in decision after decision-from Cohens v. Virginia 15 to Gibbons v. Ogden 16 -the Marshall Court took positions that enhanced the power of the Court and threatened states' rights advocates (Whittington 1999, 76-7).…”

Section: The Court As Guardian Of the Limit Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Judicial review as a self-stabilizing constitutional mechanism

Jacobi¹,

Mittal²,

Weingast³

2018

Comparative Judicial Review

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A. INTRODUCTION Most constitutions fail in less than two decades (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 129) yet the US Constitution has lasted for over 200 years-despite constitutional crises and the Civil War. The US Constitution is unusual not only in its duration, but also in the popular support it commands despite the size and diversity of the federation that it governs. 1 In previous work, we have argued that the Constitution has endured because it is "self-stabilizing" (

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Section: Constitutional Text and Structure And The Limit Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Court As Guardian Of the Limit Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial review as a self-stabilizing constitutional mechanism

Jacobi¹,

Mittal²,

Weingast³

2018

Comparative Judicial Review

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“…El origen de la revisión judicial en el mundo ocurrió por la vía del control difuso, surgido en Inglaterra en 1606, para el caso Bonham (Rakove 1997 …”

Section: Revisión Judicial En Brasil: Un Sistema Híbrido De Contrunclassified

Judicialización de la política y grupos de presión en Brasil: intereses, estrategias y resultados

Carvalho

Santos

Neto

et al. 2016

Am. Lat. Hoy. Rev. Cienc. Soc.

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BIBLID [1130-2887 (2016) 72, 59-88] Fecha de recepción: 13 de marzo del 2014 Fecha de aceptación y versión final: 15 de febrero del 2015 RESUMEN: Después de 24 años de un orden constitucional en Brasil, ¿qué se puede aprender sobre la interacción entre los grupos de presión y el Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF)?, ¿cuáles son los actores políticos que logran los mejores resultados?, ¿qué temas se juzgan más por el STF?, ¿el Supremo Tribunal privilegia específicamente algún tema o las decisiones son tomadas teniendo en cuenta más al demandante que al tema tratado? Si es así, ¿quiénes son los privilegiados por sus decisiones? Este artículo analiza la interacción entre la sociedad civil y el Poder Judicial, con base en la observación del uso de las Acciones Directas de Inconstitucionalidad (ADI). El artículo estudia, también, las demandas judiciales de los industriales sometidas al STF a través de la Confederación Nacional de la Industria (CNI), y busca evidenciar que: (1) éxito a la hora de proponer las ADI; (2) aunque tenga baja probabilidad de éxito, merece la pena judicializar el conflicto de sus intereses, y (3) la judicialización de los grupos de presión es una estrategia complementaria y articulada con el conflicto de intereses en la arena legislativa.Palabras clave: judicialización de la política; Supremo Tribunal Federal; grupos de presión; revisión judicial; CNI.ABSTRACT: After 24 years of constitutional rule in Brazil, what can be learned about the interaction between pressure groups and the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (FSC)? Which are the political actors who achieve the best results? What issues are judged more by the FSC? Does the FSC favor a specific topic or decisions are made regarding the plaintiff over the subject matter? If it were the case, who and what are the privileged ones by its decisions? This article analyzes the interaction between civil society and the Judiciary, based on observation of the use of Direct Unconstitutional Action (DUAs). The paper also assesses the industrial lawsuits, filed in stf jurisdiction by the National Industry Union (CNI) and argues that: (1) the powerful groups received most success when proposing DUAs; (2) while there was a low probability of success, the groups gained benefits from bringing the conflict of interest to Supreme Court; and (3) the judicialization of pressure groups' interests is a complementary and coordinated strategy with groups advocacy in the legislative arena.

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“…Sherman, Rutledge, and others with judicial experience particularly supported an independent policy role for the courts. Accordingly, the courts' role expanded incrementally and with little opposition (Rakove 1997).…”

Section: Protecting State Agency In National Policy-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Madison's Opponents and Constitutional Design

Robertson

2005

Am Polit Sci Rev

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U nderstanding what James Madison's opponents sought and won at the U.S. ConstitutionalConvention revises our understanding of the founders' original intentions for the durable framework that has structured American political development. The Constitution is the byproduct of expedient accommodations forced on Madison. Madison sought broad national authority independent of state governments and a swift victory for population-based congressional representation. Delegates from economically disadvantaged states opposed these plans, seeking instead to nationalize only selective public goods, to maintain most state policy autonomy, and to minimize contingencies imposed by other governments. Connecticut's delegates, particularly Roger Sherman, played a pivotal role in spoiling Madison's agenda and altering his substantive plans for Constitutional design. Madison's Convention opponents are responsible for a Constitution that nationalized only enumerated public goods and imposed potentially high transaction costs on any further nationalization of policy authority. They helped make federalism a lasting political weapon used to win substantive policy outcomes.

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The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts

Cited by 37 publications

References 0 publications

Judicial review as a self-stabilizing constitutional mechanism

Judicial review as a self-stabilizing constitutional mechanism

Judicialización de la política y grupos de presión en Brasil: intereses, estrategias y resultados

Madison's Opponents and Constitutional Design

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