The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe

Abstract

Most formal international human rights regimes establish international committees and courts that hold governments accountable to their own citizens for purely internal activities. Why would governments establish arrangements so invasive of domestic sovereignty? Two views dominate the literature. “Realist” theories assert that the most powerful democracies coerce or entice weaker countries to accept norms; “ideational” theories maintain that transnational processes of diffusion and persuasion socialize less-democratic governments to accept norms. Drawing on theories of rational delegation, I propose and test a third “republican liberal” view: Governments delegate self-interestedly to combat future threats to domestic democratic governance. Thus it is not mature and powerful democracies, but new and less-established democracies that will most strongly favor mandatory and enforceable human rights obligations. I test this proposition in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights—the most successful system of formal international human rights guarantees in the world today. The historical record of its founding—national positions, negotiating tactics, and confidential deliberations—confirms the republican liberal explanation. My claim that governments will sacrifice sovereignty to international regimes in order to dampen domestic political uncertainty and “lock in” more credible policies is then generalized theoretically and applied to other human rights regimes, coordination of conservative reaction, and international trade and monetary policy.

How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts

“…Moravcsik, for example, attributes the success of the ECtHR to the social and political interests of member states in protecting liberal democracy in the context of the Cold War. 87 Madsen generally concurs, and observes that changes in regional (geo)politics in the post-Cold War era are creating new challenges-and opportunities-for the ECtHR.…”

International organization: institutions and order in world politics

“…Of these regional arrangements, the European Union is by far the most institutionalized, with rules and formal organizations governing economic relations (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998;Eichengreen and Frieden, 1994;Kenen, 1995), human rights (Voeten, 2008;Moravcsik, 2000), legal dispute resolution (Alter, 2001;Burley and Mattli, 1993;Garrett, 1995), and, increasingly, security cooperation (Jones, 2007;Kupchan, 1997). To a greater degree than any other IGO, the EU represents a "pooling of sovereignty" (Moravcsik, 1998) and some argue that it is an example of true supranational governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998).…”

Political determinants of efforts to protect victims of human trafficking

“…The international system is characterized by power differentials, as some states are more influential than others. International relations suggest two main reasons for states to comply with international treaties lacking formal enforcement and sanction mechanisms like the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol: they are either coerced into compliance by other states [32][33][34], or compliance is a strategic choice of states in order to raise their reputation and signal credible commitments [35][36][37][38].…”