The Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxation in a Monopoly with Tax Avoidance or Evasion

Goerke, Laszlo

doi:10.1177/1091142111422440

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Therefore, following Roine (2006), Traxler (2009) and Goerke (2012), for example, we do not impose a sign on S 12 . 3 5…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry

Goerke

2016

SSRN Journal

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If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot-oligopoly, market entry will be excessive. Taxes can correct the so-called business stealing externality. We investigate how evading a tax on operating profits affects the excessive entry prediction. Tax evasion raises the number of firms in market equilibrium and can alter their welfare-maximizing number. In consequence, evasion can aggravate or mitigate excessive entry. Which of these outcomes prevails is determined by the direct welfare consequences of tax evasion and the relationship between evasion and the tax base. We also determine conditions which imply that overall welfare declines with tax evasion.

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“…Therefore, following Roine (2006), Traxler (2009) and Goerke (2012), for example, we do not impose a sign on S 12 . 3 5…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry

Goerke

2016

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

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“…2 Therefore, following Roine (2006), Traxler (2009) and Goerke (2012), for example, we do not impose a sign on S 12 . In order to produce, a firm has to enter the market at cost K, K > 0.…”

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confidence: 99%

Tax evasion in a Cournot oligopoly with endogenous entry

Goerke

2016

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot-oligopoly, market entry will be excessive. Taxes can correct the so-called business stealing externality. We investigate how evading a tax on operating profits affects the excessive entry prediction. Tax evasion raises the number of firms in market equilibrium and can alter their welfare-maximizing number. In consequence, evasion can aggravate or mitigate excessive entry. Which of these outcomes prevails is determined by the direct welfare consequences of tax evasion and the relationship between evasion and the tax base. We also determine conditions which imply that overall welfare declines with tax evasion. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Codes: D430, H260, L130.

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The Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxation in a Monopoly with Tax Avoidance or Evasion

Cited by 2 publications

References 52 publications

Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry

Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry

Tax evasion in a Cournot oligopoly with endogenous entry

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