The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Schweinzer, Paul; Segev, Ella

doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9774-2

Cited by 71 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By continuity, equilibria (with small abatement efforts) will exist under a prize structure which gives the same prize to every player except the one coming last. For details see Schweinzer & Segev (2012). 24 Once a nation has committed her share of output (1 − α)y(e i ) to the agreement, the only possibility for free-riding is on her abatement efforts-which we show in proposition 1 to be suboptimal.…”

Section: Agreement Formationmentioning

confidence: 85%

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Bos

Roussillon

Schweinzer

2016

Scandinavian J Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose a simple mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient abatement efforts. Participation in the most stylised form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive which may serve as effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of International Environmental Agreements. (JEL C7, D7, H4, Q5.

show abstract

Section: Agreement Formationmentioning

confidence: 85%

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Bos

Roussillon

Schweinzer

2016

Scandinavian J Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…23 The participation issue in subsection 2.5 already indicates that equilibrium 23 The parameters used for plotting the figure are n = 2, p = q = 1, a = 3/4, b = 1/10, r = 2, x * = 0.0601, g * = 0.0081, α * = 0.73, β * = 0.5, and endogenous provision of the public good. We should also point out that there is a long-standing issue with the existence of symmetric pure strategy equilibria when r > 1 in standard contests with many players (see, e.g., Schweinzer and Segev (2012)). As shown in propositions 2 and 3, however, existence conditions are not as restrictive in the present environment.…”

Section: Example Of An Efficient Tax Lottery Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries

Giebe

Schweinzer

2014

European Journal of Political Economy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest-which we call a 'tax lottery'-can correct the distortion in private consumption while, at the same time, inducing efficient provision of the public good and balancing the government's budget. The result does not depend on whether the public good is provided exogenously or dependent on actual tax revenue. We show that neither pure fundraising contests nor a sales tax combined with a 'simple' lottery can induce efficiency in the standard environment.JEL-Code: C700, D700, H000.

show abstract

“…Thus, the equilibrium characterized by k F corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium in that Tullock contest. It has been shown by Schweinzer and Segev (2008) that the winner-take-all structure is optimal if this symmetric equilibrium exists and if the objective is to maximize total effort. That objective, in our case, corresponds to maximizing n k F , and, thus, the expected value of the best innovation.…”

Section: Tullock Contests Note That (3) Can Be Written Asmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation contests with entry auction

Giebe

2014

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest, an innovation is procured employing either a fixed prize or a first-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple strategy that does not depend on rivals' private information. JEL classifications: D21, D44, D82, H57, O31, O32.

show abstract

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Cited by 71 publications

References 16 publications

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries

Innovation contests with entry auction

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About