2003
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(02)00021-4
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The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance

Abstract: Venture capitalists (VCs) not only finance but also add value to start-up companies. Advising firms is time consuming and creates a trade-off between intensity of advice and portfolio size. We jointly determine the optimal number of portfolio companies and the intensity of managerial advice. Diminishing returns to advice per firm call for a larger portfolio. With progressively increasing managerial effort cost, however, a larger number crowds out advice to each individual firm. As they receive less support, en… Show more

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Cited by 250 publications
(130 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
(20 reference statements)
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“…7 Cestone and White (2003) consider the financing of competing ventures through a single investor. Inderst and Mueller (2003) consider competition among start-ups for VC financing in the capital market, while Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2005), and Inderst et al (2007) consider competition among portfolio companies of the same VC for the VC's scarce resources.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 Cestone and White (2003) consider the financing of competing ventures through a single investor. Inderst and Mueller (2003) consider competition among start-ups for VC financing in the capital market, while Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2005), and Inderst et al (2007) consider competition among portfolio companies of the same VC for the VC's scarce resources.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since the reaction functions of the two entrepreneurs are symmetric, the Nash-equilibrium of the e¤ort choice subgame is obtained by setting p j p i in the …rst-order condition (10), and then solving for p i ; giving (11). Substituting the Nash-equilibrium level of e¤ort (11) into the entrepreneurs'objective function, (8), and in the VC's objective function, (9), gives the VC's pro…ts (12) and the entrepreneurs'pro…ts (13). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our paper is also related to the work by Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), further extended by Bernile and Lyandres (2003). In these papers a VC has limited resources that he can devote to his start-ups, and adding an additional start-up to the portfolio always weakens both the VC's and the entrepreneurs'incentives.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 90%
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