2018
DOI: 10.1007/s12652-018-1128-1
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The optimal game model of energy consumption for nodes cooperation in WSN

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Cited by 14 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The advantages of swarm intelligence is that it ensures adaptability and stability of the environment which is useful when needed to conserve energy in wireless sensor networks [42,43]. Furthermore, the bioinspired PSO has become one of the most significant optimization algorithms and has been extensively utilised to solve complex optimization problems.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The advantages of swarm intelligence is that it ensures adaptability and stability of the environment which is useful when needed to conserve energy in wireless sensor networks [42,43]. Furthermore, the bioinspired PSO has become one of the most significant optimization algorithms and has been extensively utilised to solve complex optimization problems.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One notable merit of this approach is that it can operate independently of the topology of the sensory field. The work in [157] proposes a dynamic node scheduling scheme using non cooperative game theoretic strategy to significantly cut down idle listening and improve the energy efficiency of WSNs. The minimum dominating cover set selection strategy based on game theory is discussed in [158] and a game theory-based approach for target coverage in a directional sensor network is described in [159].…”
Section: Figure 18 State Diagram Of Obsp Protocolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…is a Nash equilibrium of the game G = fM, S, ug. 32 Property 1. There is at least one Nash equilibrium in a finite perfect information game.…”
Section: Model Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If any participant i M and any strategy s i S satisfy u i ( s i * , s i * ) u i ( s i , s i * ) , then the strategy combination s * = ( s i * , s i * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ = { M , S , u } . 32…”
Section: Design and Analysis Of Routing Game Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%