The optimal decision of e-retailer based on return-freight insurance – considering the loss aversion of customers

Zhan, Wentao; Pan, Wenting; Zhao, Yi; Zhang, Shengyu; Wang, Yimeng; Jiang, Minghui

doi:10.1108/k-07-2023-1187

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

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“…Linze et al (2024) [22] researched the Stackelberg game model to explore the conditions for developing environmental, social and governance related cost-sharing contracts and their subsequent implications for supply chain coordination. Zhan et al (2023) [23] proposed a model that includes the following three scenarios: no return freight insurance, customer purchase return freight insurance, and free e-retail return freight insurance. A Stackelberg game between e-retailers and manufacturers is also modelled for study.…”

Section: Review Of Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Supply Chain Coordination Optimization Model with Revenue Sharing and Carbon Awareness

Kumari,

Rajoria,

Chauhan

et al. 2024

Sustainability

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The present study explores the impact of carbon emissions on supply chain coordination, where the supply chain entities are a retailer and a distributor. The study also involves two types of systems, namely centralized and decentralized. A centralized system computes the profit of the entire supply chain, including the profit of a retailer and a distributor, using the traditional optimization technique. In contrast, a decentralized system computes the profit of both a retailer and a distributor independently and uses the Stackelberg sequence for profit optimization. According to the Stackelberg sequence, one entity is considered a leader and the other a follower. When the profit in both systems is compared, it is found to be higher in the centralized system. So, to coordinate the system, a revenue-sharing contract is applied to coordinate the supply chain under a stock–time–price-sensitive demand rate. Finally, a carbon emission cost is implemented to the profits of both systems to make the model more sustainable. The main objective of the research is to optimize the profit of the supply chain by considering the concept of revenue-sharing contracts and making the system more sustainable through the implementation of carbon emission cost. The overall study concludes that the revenue-sharing fraction helps in coordinating the system and 0.4 is the value of the revenue-sharing fraction that perfectly coordinates the system. Due to this coordination, both the parties will gain profit, i.e., retailer and distributor, and this whole phenomenon increases the profit of the supply chain. A sensitivity analysis is also performed to check the stability of the model, and the model is found to be quite stable. A numerical example is illustrated, providing the result of the model.

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Section: Review Of Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Supply Chain Coordination Optimization Model with Revenue Sharing and Carbon Awareness

Kumari,

Rajoria,

Chauhan

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Optimal pricing strategy in the closed-loop supply chain using game theory under government subsidy scenario: A case study

Dehghani Sadrabadi,

Makui,

Ghousi

et al. 2024

Journal of Energy Storage

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The optimal operation decision of gas station considering charging pile installation – conflict and coordination

Jiang,

Xue

et al. 2024

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PurposeIn the construction of charging piles, traditional gas stations possess significant advantages in terms of regional and financial resources. The transformation of gas stations into “refueling+charging” integrated gas stations relies on charging pile manufacturers and government, involving coordination issues with them. This paper aims to propose a joint coordination contract based on the principles of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing. The objective is to achieve systemic coordination among integrated gas stations, charging pile manufacturers, and the government, optimizing the planning of the quantity of charging piles and charging prices.Design/methodology/approachWe have constructed an operational system model based on the Stackelberg game between charging pile manufacturers, integrated gas stations, and government. We have analyzed the optimal quantity of charging piles and charging prices under the impact of government subsidy policies in both decentralized and centralized operation scenarios. Additionally, we have proposed a joint coordination contract based on cost-sharing and revenue-sharing to coordinate this tripartite operational system.FindingsThe study reveals that, under simple cooperative contracts, the optimal decision does not yield maximum profits for the operational system due to the “double-marginal effect”. However, under the impact of the joint coordination contract, which combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing as proposed in this paper, gas stations will consider the charging pile manufacturer’s costs and government subsidies when determining the optimal quantity and price. This not only achieves system coordination but also results in Pareto improvement in the benefits of all system members by adjusting contract parameters.Originality/valueThe value of this research lies in its insights into operational strategies for the construction of charging piles for electric vehicles. By analyzing optimal decisions under different contract arrangements, the study provides guidance to relevant stakeholders, enabling the operational system to achieve greater efficiency and coordination and realize more extensive Pareto improvements. Furthermore, it extends the application of coordination contract theory in the context of charging pile construction and operations.

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The optimal decision of e-retailer based on return-freight insurance – considering the loss aversion of customers

Cited by 3 publications

References 18 publications

A Supply Chain Coordination Optimization Model with Revenue Sharing and Carbon Awareness

A Supply Chain Coordination Optimization Model with Revenue Sharing and Carbon Awareness

Optimal pricing strategy in the closed-loop supply chain using game theory under government subsidy scenario: A case study

The optimal operation decision of gas station considering charging pile installation – conflict and coordination

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