The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View

Abstract

In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better (Rom. 8:28). I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment of God’s intelligence.

Open Theism and Risk Management: A Philosophical and Biological Perspective

“…Grössl and Vicens describe Gregory Boyd's position as a limited‐risk open theism because this view says that it is impossible for God to fail to achieve the MCP (Boyd 2011, 2015). They write, “We call this view ‘limited‐risk’ since the risks in which God engages are limited to certain specific undesirable events occurring, and not to the realization of His most central purpose for creation” (Grössl and Vicens 2014, 478).…”