Search citation statements
Paper Sections
Citation Types
Year Published
Publication Types
Relationship
Authors
Journals
In the ontology of music the Aristotelian theory of musical works is the view that musical works are immanent universals. The Aristotelian theory (hereafter Musical Aristotelianism) is an attractive and serviceable hypothesis. However, it is overlooked as a genuine competitor to the more well-known theories of Musical Platonism and nominalism. Worse still, there is no detailed account in the literature of the nature of the universals that the Aristotelian identifies musical works with. In this paper, I argue that the best version of Musical Aristotelianism identifies musical works with structural universals. I first motivate the view by outlining its explanatory benefits. I then argue that Musical Aristotelianism is preferable to Musical Platonism and present a novel account of musical works as structural universals by developing D.M. Armstrong's theory of structural universals. I discuss the consequences of Musical Aristotelianism with respect to on-going issues in debates about musical works and defend the view against an influential objection, concluding that Musical Aristotelianism is a genuine competitor in debates about the nature of musical works. a work of music is a token of some type. The main disagreement among Musical Platonists concerns the nature of types -whether musical works are eternal types (Dodd 2000) or creatable indicated types (Howell 2002;Trivedi 2002;Walters 2013). Let us call the former view extreme Musical Platonism and the latter moderate Musical Platonism.Musical Platonism has a broader meaning than this type-theoretic interpretation. A Musical Platonist could identify musical works with a Platonic entity that is not a type. They might say a musical work is a Platonic universal. On this Platonic variant, musical works are not types. The relevant contrast, then, between Musical Platonism and Musical Aristotelianism is that musical works, according to the Platonist, are transcendental in the sense that an entity lacks spatial location, is eternal, acausal, or immutable, etc, whereas the Aristotelian says that musical works are immanent. 3 The Musical nominalist provides an account of musical works without positing Platonic types or universals (whether transcendental or immanent). Traditionally, Musical nominalism was understood as the view that musical works are classes of performances (in the same way the nominalist more generally says a property is a class of individuals). More recently, Musical nominalism has taken on a more materialist flavour, without any reference to classes. Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson (2004) have suggested that musical works are mereological fusions of performances and (perhaps) the score, score-copies, recordings, and the compositional activity of the composer; they have styled this theory as a form of perdurantism (Caplan & Matheson 2006). 4 Chris Tillman (2011) has argued that musical works are multiply locatable concrete objects such that a musical work is wholly located at its manifestations; the work coincides with its manifestations. The relevant cont...
In the ontology of music the Aristotelian theory of musical works is the view that musical works are immanent universals. The Aristotelian theory (hereafter Musical Aristotelianism) is an attractive and serviceable hypothesis. However, it is overlooked as a genuine competitor to the more well-known theories of Musical Platonism and nominalism. Worse still, there is no detailed account in the literature of the nature of the universals that the Aristotelian identifies musical works with. In this paper, I argue that the best version of Musical Aristotelianism identifies musical works with structural universals. I first motivate the view by outlining its explanatory benefits. I then argue that Musical Aristotelianism is preferable to Musical Platonism and present a novel account of musical works as structural universals by developing D.M. Armstrong's theory of structural universals. I discuss the consequences of Musical Aristotelianism with respect to on-going issues in debates about musical works and defend the view against an influential objection, concluding that Musical Aristotelianism is a genuine competitor in debates about the nature of musical works. a work of music is a token of some type. The main disagreement among Musical Platonists concerns the nature of types -whether musical works are eternal types (Dodd 2000) or creatable indicated types (Howell 2002;Trivedi 2002;Walters 2013). Let us call the former view extreme Musical Platonism and the latter moderate Musical Platonism.Musical Platonism has a broader meaning than this type-theoretic interpretation. A Musical Platonist could identify musical works with a Platonic entity that is not a type. They might say a musical work is a Platonic universal. On this Platonic variant, musical works are not types. The relevant contrast, then, between Musical Platonism and Musical Aristotelianism is that musical works, according to the Platonist, are transcendental in the sense that an entity lacks spatial location, is eternal, acausal, or immutable, etc, whereas the Aristotelian says that musical works are immanent. 3 The Musical nominalist provides an account of musical works without positing Platonic types or universals (whether transcendental or immanent). Traditionally, Musical nominalism was understood as the view that musical works are classes of performances (in the same way the nominalist more generally says a property is a class of individuals). More recently, Musical nominalism has taken on a more materialist flavour, without any reference to classes. Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson (2004) have suggested that musical works are mereological fusions of performances and (perhaps) the score, score-copies, recordings, and the compositional activity of the composer; they have styled this theory as a form of perdurantism (Caplan & Matheson 2006). 4 Chris Tillman (2011) has argued that musical works are multiply locatable concrete objects such that a musical work is wholly located at its manifestations; the work coincides with its manifestations. The relevant cont...
There are compelling reasons to believe that musical works are abstract. However, this hypothesis conflicts with the platitude that musical works are appreciated by means of audition: the things that enter our ear canals and make our eardrums vibrate must be concrete, so how can musical works be listened to if they are abstract? This question constitutes the audibility problem. In this paper, I assess Julian Dodd’s elaborate attempt to solve it, and contend that Dodd’s attempt is unsuccessful. Then I discuss what I take to be the ideal response to the audibility problem, and show that it ultimately fails. I contend, consequently, that the project of construing musical works as audible is disheartening. Accordingly, in my last section, I will argue the audibility problem may be satisfactorily resolved without ascribing audibility to musical works.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.