The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets

Frey, Bruno S.; Oberholzer‐Gee, Felix; Eichenberger, Reiner

doi:10.1086/262060

Cited by 296 publications

(168 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Norm-based motives are generated by a desire to pursue the public interest; they include patriotism, civic duty, 4 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a literature survey on motivation crowding theory. Studies that examine the link between extrinsic rewards and individuals' propensity to act prosocially include Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Rustichini (2000a, 2000b), Benabou and Tirole (2006), and Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009). and a sense of loyalty to the government. Affective motives refer to behavior motivated by emotional responses to different social contexts and they are characterized by a desire to help others.…”

Section: Theoretical Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the sorting explanation of how extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic rewards rather than on how extrinsic rewards affect individuals' willingness to act prosocially (Frey 1992;Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997;Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996). Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a large-scale longitudinal survey that allows us to trace individuals' labor market histories, we estimate transition probabilities from the private into the public sector.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Georgellis

Iossa

Tabvuma

2010

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

251

211

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Employing intrinsically motivated individuals has been proposed as a means of improving public sector performance. In this article, we investigate whether intrinsic motivation affects the sorting of employees between the private and the public sectors, paying particular attention to whether extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation. Using British longitudinal data, we find that individuals are attracted to the public sector by the intrinsic rather than the extrinsic rewards that the sector offers. We also find evidence supporting the intrinsic motivation crowding out hypothesis, in that, higher extrinsic rewards reduce the propensity of intrinsically motivated individuals to accept public sector employment. This is, however, only true for two segments of the UK public sector: the higher education sector and the National Health Service. Although our findings inform the literature on public service motivation, they also pose the question whether lower extrinsic rewards could increase the average quality of job matches in the public sector, thus improving performance without the need for high-powered incentives.

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Section: Theoretical Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Georgellis

Iossa

Tabvuma

2010

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

251

211

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“…The increase in salary has eliminated these good intentions. 21 Terminology borrowed from Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996). (λ − C − W ) follows from the strategy followed by future incumbents and the voter.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Elections Lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Swank

Visser

2003

SSRN Journal

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“…The territory is spatially de…ned as the area S of the trigonometric circle. 5 The city is composed of "neighborhoods". A neighborhood is a set of identical agents, whose mass is normalized to one and is supposed to be located on a single point.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, building on the menu-auction framework developed by Bernheim and Whinston [1] and applied by Grossman and Helpman in a series of studies [7], [8], we turn to the equilibrium of the lobbying game played by the government and the neighborhoods, using as a benchmark the social planner solution. 1 Examples of public processes related to decisions on the siting of such facilities in Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be found in Kuhn and Ballard [11], Wolsink [15] and Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger [5], respectively. 2 Given this perspective, we leave aside the issue of optimal taxation policy which could a¤ect the welfare consequences of the location of such a facility, by means of subsidies and taxes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why not in your backyard? On the location and size of a public facility

Bellettini

Kempf

2013

Regional Science and Urban Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: R00.

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The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets

Cited by 296 publications

References 22 publications

Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Do Elections Lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Why not in your backyard? On the location and size of a public facility

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