Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good (bad) for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable (disfavorable) attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it.Some things are basically good for you-good for you, but not solely in virtue of being suitably related to other things that are good for you. Subjectivists about welfare claim that something is basically good for you if and only if (and to the extent that), in a certain familiar sense, it suits or fits you. Some things suit certain people better than others: the symphony better suits aficionados of classical music than it does people who only like jazz. Some things do not suit any normal human being: drinking a can of paint, or spending a year counting blades of grass. Something suits you, in this familiar sense, to the extent that you have (or would, in the right conditions, have) a favorable attitude toward it. Thus, subjectivism says that something is basically good for you just if, and to the extent that, you have a certain favorable attitude, A, toward it under the right conditions, C. Determinate versions of subjectivism specify A and C. For instance, on one version, something is basically good for you if and only if and to the extent that you would desire it if you were fully informed and perfectly rational.