2019
DOI: 10.4324/9780429313264
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The OAU After Twenty Years

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“…What is more, the OAU could not mitigate the growing intransigence of the government of Morocco through providing negative or positive incentives, as it lacked any leverage to coerce the government of Morocco to make a territorial concession. Amadu Sesay argues that the paralysis of the OAU’s conflict resolution efforts in the Western Sahara dispute in the early 1980s was due to a “lack of material resources with which it could embark upon an effective mediatory role” (Sesay, Ojo & Fasehun 1984:56). When in November 1984 a majority of the OAU member states recognized the Western Sahara as an official member of the OAU, Morocco immediately suspended its membership of the OAU, effectively ending the African mediation effort to end the conflict (Labella 2003:78; Zoubir 1996:190).…”
Section: Case Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What is more, the OAU could not mitigate the growing intransigence of the government of Morocco through providing negative or positive incentives, as it lacked any leverage to coerce the government of Morocco to make a territorial concession. Amadu Sesay argues that the paralysis of the OAU’s conflict resolution efforts in the Western Sahara dispute in the early 1980s was due to a “lack of material resources with which it could embark upon an effective mediatory role” (Sesay, Ojo & Fasehun 1984:56). When in November 1984 a majority of the OAU member states recognized the Western Sahara as an official member of the OAU, Morocco immediately suspended its membership of the OAU, effectively ending the African mediation effort to end the conflict (Labella 2003:78; Zoubir 1996:190).…”
Section: Case Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%