The Nuclear Safety Authority in France: A Dogma of “Independence” and Institutional Fragility

Abstract

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Complementary lessons learned from the testing strategies used for radiation emergencies and COVID-19: A white paper from The International Association of Biological and Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR) Radiation Dosimetry (IABERD)

“…As such, sharing of knowledge and resources in the event of a large-scale emergency is an absolute necessity. To cope with a large number of potentially exposed individuals/patients, there have been considerable efforts devoted to networking (FAO et al, 2015;Kulka et al, 2012;2017;Monteiro Gil et al, 2017). Networks must be established well in advance in order to validate the competencies of all teams through interlaboratory comparisons, to evaluate the capacity for sample analysis, and to corroborate logistical issues such as transportation, data exchange and standardization of analyses.…”

“…There are indeed several examples of distrust of the radiation response community following radiation emergencies, for example following Chernobyl (OECD, 2003;Hadna, 2017). The biodosimetry community would be well advised to further develop mutual discourse with the public to help guard against loss of confidence in the scientific community and in the discourse of experts, with a strong emphasis on pedagogy towards the public (Martell et al, 2022).…”

“…Indeed, transparency and shared understanding of situations are key elements in modern crisis management. The lack of transparency in past nuclear crisis management has adversely affected nuclear activity for decades, as was particularly the case for the Chernobyl accident (not only in the USSR but also in proximate countries, e.g., France) (OECD, 2003;Hadna, 2017). With social networks and the democratization of measuring instruments, indeed the development of citizen science approaches, it is now obvious that it is no longer possible to manage future crises in a democratic country in the same ways used in the past which depended on full trust of the authorities (McCormick, 2012;Brown et al, 2016;Bottollier-Depois et al, 2017;Kenens et al, 2020).…”

‘It Is a Tradition in the Nuclear Industry . . . Secrecy’: Political Opportunity Structures and Nuclear Knowledge Production in France

“…Public information about nuclear energy is by nature incomplete and knowledge production restricted. As Hadna (2017: 138) notes, ‘full transparency would not therefore be practicable’. Discussing transparency efforts, one EDF engineer notes, ‘There are bound to be confidential documents .…”

“…Institutionalized monitoring stakeholders such as ASN and IRSN assume the role of counter-experts, producing nuclear knowledge, monitoring emissions, assessing nuclear safety through independent measures, and informing the public via online publications. ASN’s central values of independence and transparency revolve around its three core objectives: information, regulation, and control (Hadna, 2017: 125).…”